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FREE SPEECH AND JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF
Joseph Blocher∗
Law often prioritizes justified true beliefs. Evidence, even if probative and correct, must
have a proper foundation. Expert witness testimony must be the product of reliable
principles and methods. Prosecutors are not permitted to trick juries into convicting a
defendant, even if that defendant is truly guilty. Judges’ reasons, and not just the
correctness of their holdings, are the engines of precedent.
Lawyers are, in short, familiar with the notion that one must be right for the right reasons.
And yet the standard epistemic theory of the First Amendment — that the marketplace of
ideas is the “best test of truth” — has generally focused on truth alone, as if all true beliefs
must be treated equally. This thin account leaves the epistemic theory vulnerable to
withering criticism, especially in a “post-truth” era.
This Article suggests that the epistemic theory of the First Amendment might be reframed
around a different value: not truth alone, but knowledge, roughly defined as justified true
belief. Philosophers from Plato until the present day have explored what makes knowledge
distinct and distinctly valuable; echoes of those efforts can be heard in First Amendment
theory and doctrine as well. A knowledge-based account need not limit the protections of
free speech to justified true belief, any more than the marketplace model covers only truth,
and may even help resolve thorny First Amendment issues like those involving professional
speech and institutional deference. The goal of this Article is to provide a richer epistemic
account of the First Amendment at a time when it is sorely needed.

INTRODUCTION

A

century ago, Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States1
helped lay the foundations of U.S. free speech law and theory.
Though he was hardly writing on a blank slate, Justice Holmes captured
something powerful when he wrote that “the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and . . . truth is the only ground upon which [people’s] wishes
safely can be carried out.”2 This marketplace of ideas model was “virtually canonized” for generations3 and has shaped First Amendment
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Lanty L. Smith ’67 Professor of Law, Duke Law School. Many thanks to Rebecca Aviel,
Vince Blasi, Alan Chen, Claudia Haupt, Paul Horwitz, Sam Kamin, Andy Koppelman, Govind
Persad, Fred Schauer, Alex Tsesis, and the faculty of University of Denver Sturm College of Law
for helpful comments, and to Izaak Earnhardt for excellent research assistance.
1 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
2 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3 William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification,
30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“The most influential argument supporting the constitutional commitment to freedom of speech is the contention that speech is valuable because it leads to the discovery
of truth.”); see also Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130
(1989) (“The most familiar argument for freedom of speech is that speech promotes the discovery
of truth.”).
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doctrine in significant ways.4 But it was and is, to repurpose Justice
Holmes’s own words, “an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”5
Many people seem ready to conclude that the experiment has failed.
Developments in psychology, economics, history, sociology, and other
scholarly fields have drawn attention to the host of problems — cognitive limitations, motivated reasoning, racism, sexism, resource inequalities, and the like — that make it impossible for the marketplace of ideas
to reliably deliver on its promise of identifying “truth.”6 Abrams’s own
legacy provides an example, since the influence of the case undoubtedly
owes a great deal to the power and beauty of Justice Holmes’s prose,
rather than the “truth” of the ideas it expresses.7
Such critiques are, for the most part, internal to the epistemic theory:
they accept truth as the end goal of the First Amendment but doubt the
ability of unregulated speech to deliver it. Another set consists of external challenges — those suggesting that the First Amendment’s lodestar
is not truth, but democracy, personal autonomy, or some other value.8
But scholarly debates are not the most serious threat to the marketplace model. A robust system of free speech depends fundamentally on
widely shared social, political, and cultural commitments,9 and it would
be putting it mildly to say that there is widespread anxiety about truth
and the ability of speech — especially but not exclusively online
speech — to counter falsehoods and lies. Every day, headlines deliver
discouraging answers to John Milton’s rhetorical question, “Let [Truth]
and falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free
and open encounter?”10 The undoubted prevalence of free and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4 See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 825 n.7 (2008)
(collecting cases invoking the marketplace model).
5 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6 See infra section I.B.1, pp. 451–55.
7 Cf. Richard A. Posner, Introduction, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES xvii (Richard A. Posner
ed., 1992) (arguing that some of Justice Holmes’s opinions “owe their distinction to their rhetorical
skill rather than to the qualities of their reasoning”).
8 See infra section I.B.2, pp. 455–59; see also Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First
Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 909–10 (2010) (noting that “the free speech literature appears
increasingly to have detached itself from the empirical and instrumental epistemic arguments”
largely in favor of those based on democracy and autonomy).
9 If a citation is necessary, one could do worse than Judge Learned Hand: “Liberty lies in the
hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no
constitution, no law, no court even can do much to help it.” LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY (1944), reprinted in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952); John M. Harlan, The Bill of Rights and the
Constitution: An Excerpt from an Address, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1964) (quoting same).
10 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED
PRINTING 45 (H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1961) (1644); see also Vincent Blasi, A Reader’s
Guide to John Milton’s Areopagitica, the Foundational Essay of the First Amendment Tradition,
2017 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 310.
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accessible true information — one promise of the information age —
seems to have done little to stem the tide.11
Against this tide, a retreat from the epistemic theory of the First
Amendment, or perhaps from free speech altogether, might seem attractive or even necessary. After all, if it is to model its own purported
virtues, the marketplace theory must recognize that it, too, can go the
way of other “fighting faiths.”12 If we are living in a “post-truth” era,13
then perhaps we need a post-truth First Amendment.
And yet such a capitulation could worsen the crisis. The epistemological problem of the “post-truth” era is not simply that some people no
longer value truth, but that so many believe falsehoods. When people
act on outlandish but truly held beliefs they often demonstrate a strong —
even perversely courageous — commitment to what they believe to be
factual truths.14
One therefore cannot combat the phenomenon simply by insisting on
the value of truth. Nor is it possible to fully sidestep the problem by
making democracy, autonomy, or some other value the central goal of
the First Amendment. Those theories, too, frequently depend in part on
the epistemic function of free speech. A well-functioning democracy
relies on expert knowledge.15 Lies and misinformation can interfere
with personal autonomy.16
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
11 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION,
DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS passim (2018).
12 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes
himself suggested as much: “If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech
is that they should be given their chance and have their way.” Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
13 Amy B. Wang, “Post-Truth” Named 2016 Word of the Year by Oxford Dictionaries, WASH.
POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/post-truthnamed-2016-word-of-the-year-by-oxford-dictionaries/ [https://perma.cc/WV5N-ECAZ] (“It’s official:
Truth is dead. Facts are passe.”).
14 This is not universally true, of course — some are simply trolling, manipulating, or otherwise
engaged in expression that is indifferent to truth. Neither the marketplace model nor my
knowledge-based alternative is well suited to address situations where truth itself is irrelevant.
From the perspective of an epistemic theory, and at risk of slight overstatement, “these men are
nihilists. There’s nothing to be afraid of.” THE BIG LEBOWSKI (PolyGram Filmed Entertainment
& Working Title Films 1998).
15 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE, at ix (2012) (“Any modern society
needs expert knowledge in order to survive and prosper.”); see also TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH
OF EXPERTISE: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT
MATTERS 216 (2017) (“[T]he collapse of the relationship between experts and citizens is a dysfunction of democracy itself.”).
16 See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 116–17 (1990); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991) (“Lying creates a kind of mental slavery that is an offense
against the victim’s humanity for many of the reasons that physical slavery is.”); Jonathan D. Varat,
Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53
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The challenge, therefore, is to conceptualize the First Amendment in
a way that recognizes the power of the critiques but also safeguards the
necessary epistemic values of free speech, above and beyond an unrealistic faith that free speech will deliver “truth.” And because freedom of
speech is an actual (albeit normative) practice,17 and not just a matter
of theory, any account of free speech values should be built using the
materials of that practice, including but not limited to legal doctrine.18
Those materials should not be expected to point squarely in favor of a
single, overarching free speech principle,19 but they can still clarify our
existing commitments and help shape new ones.
The search for free speech principles has also regularly drawn on
insights from other disciplines — from the marketplace of ideas as a
whole. Indeed, the basic insight of the marketplace metaphor itself had
earlier been articulated by Milton, Mill, and others, and its announcement in Abrams owes more to economics, political philosophy, and history than to precedent.20 And because the value of free speech is partly
an epistemological question,21 it is worth considering that for generations of epistemologists, the most common lodestar is not truth — the
central concern of the Holmesian approach to free speech22 — but
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1113 (2006) (noting argument that manipulative lies “are incompatible with
the respect for human autonomy underlying the First Amendment”); see also IMMANUEL KANT,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 48 (Lewis White Beck trans., The BobbsMerrill Co. 1959) (1785) (arguing that lies violate human autonomy by treating people as means
rather than ends).
17 It might be more accurate to say “set of practices,” given the many distinct activities that
reside under the header: freedoms of the press, artistic creation, scientific research, political debate,
and so on. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 14 (1982).
18 See POST, supra note 15, at 5 (“To determine the purposes of the First Amendment, therefore,
we must consult the actual shape of entrenched First Amendment jurisprudence.”); Robert Post,
Replies, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 618
(2011) (“Because law typically acquires authority from the commitments and principles of those
whom it seeks to govern, I have sought to identify this fundamental purpose by inquiring into our
historical commitments and principles.” (citing Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the
Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul
Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1474 (2007))).
19 See, e.g., Robert Post, Essay, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249, 1271 (1995) (“There is in fact no general free speech principle . . . .”); Steven Shiffrin, Dissent,
Democratic Participation, and First Amendment Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (2011) (“Too
many values interact in too many complicated ways to expect that a single, or small set of values,
would emerge as the transcendent master value in resolving freedom of speech questions. Because
of this, an eclectic approach is both the most descriptive and the best normative methodology with
which to approach free speech issues.” (footnote omitted)).
20 See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.
21 Cf. Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 U. WASH. L. REV. 445,
447 (2012) (“[T]he First Amendment faces what I call an epistemological problem: specifically, the
problem of figuring out just how knowledge fits within the First Amendment.”).
22 Even to call it “Holmesian” is to raise questions, for Justice Holmes’s own view of truth was
complex and debatable. See Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
1015, 1039, 1056–57; infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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knowledge.23 And although there are deep divisions and ongoing
debates about the definition and value of knowledge (these are the basic
questions of epistemology, after all24), philosophers since Plato have
often taken as their starting point a tripartite definition of knowledge
as justified true belief (JTB),25 and this Article will use the labels
interchangeably.
Although JTB has been subject to searching examinations and criticisms far beyond the scope of this Article,26 it remains central in the
epistemological debates. The second and third parts of the tripartite
definition are, generally speaking, less controversial than the first: One
cannot “know” something that is false,27 or that one does not believe.
But, and somewhat more controversially, even a true belief will not constitute knowledge if it is not properly justified. A lucky guess that is
borne out, for example, or an accurate belief generated by lying or
manipulation, is not “knowledge.”
Broadening the First Amendment’s frame to focus on justifications
of belief, and not just on truth alone, provides a richer epistemic defense
of the goal of free speech — not just as a means of identifying particular
factual or political truths, but as a means of strengthening our
mechanisms of belief.28 Standard accounts focus on the maximization
of truth but give no particular attention to the justifications for true
belief — the individual habits of mind29 and social practices30 that support the acquisition and belief of truths. This keeps cognition at the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
23 Matthias Steup, Epistemology, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Dec. 14, 2005),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology [https://perma.cc/4W4T-8BUZ] (“[E]pistemology is
the study of knowledge and justified belief.”).
24 Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Willful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the “Equal
Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 29, 44 (“[There are] enormous theoretical difficulties in understanding and applying the concept of knowledge. Epistemologists have sought to elucidate the concept of knowledge and have
found this project no small task.”).
25 See RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, THE FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWING 43 (1982); Stewart
Cohen, Justification and Truth, 46 PHIL. STUD. 279 (1984) (discussing schools of thought relating
to justification and truth). For more classic sources, see ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 172–78 (1981); PLATO, THEAETETUS 201b–201d, at 80 (M.J. Levett trans., 1992).
See generally BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS passim (1948).
26 To take the most obvious example, Edmund Gettier effectively proved that JTB alone cannot
provide a satisfactory account of knowledge. See Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963).
27 Whether someone can “know” something that is not false, but which has no standard propositional truth value, is a harder question. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, in
LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 261, 262 (1990)
(“Knowledge of the heart must come from the heart . . . .”).
28 See, e.g., Ashley Messenger, Essay, The Epistemic and Moral Dimensions of Fake News and
the First Amendment, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 328, 337 (2017) (“If ‘knowledge’ is ‘true, justified
belief,’ then one who wishes to have knowledge must care about whether that belief is justified.”).
29 See infra section II.B.1, pp. 477–82
30 See infra section II.B.2, pp. 482–86.
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center of the First Amendment, while accepting the thrust of the internal
critiques (which are focused on truth, not justifications) and incorporating some elements of the external critiques (including the relevance of
social practices).31
A knowledge-based approach to free speech can also do better than
the marketplace model in directly addressing the broader epistemological crisis in free speech. People have access to more information — more
truth propositions — than ever before, and may continue to believe
passionately in the importance of truth. There are, of course, bitter
disagreements about whether certain ideas are true. But the more fundamental disagreement and doubt is about which sources, practices, and
institutions provide reliable or otherwise desirable information.32 This
is a debate about valid justifications, not about whether particular
beliefs are true, or for that matter whether truth is important.
In order to be successful, a knowledge-based approach must not only
address these challenges; it must also account for existing practices and
legal rules. Fortunately, what works in theory in this case also works in
practice. Many legal rules (and, in some respects, the basic rules of legal
argumentation) are predicated on a commitment to establishing proper
justifications.33 If a prosecutor lies to secure the conviction of a guilty
criminal, he or she will have created a true belief in the minds of the
jury — but that belief will not be justified, and might not be permitted
to stand.34
Of course, the rules of the courtroom do not apply mutatis mutandis
to public discourse,35 so one must ask whether the First Amendment
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31
32

See infra section I.C, pp. 459–64.
American Views: Trust, Media, and Democracy, KNIGHT FOUND. (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://knightfoundation.org/reports/american-views-trust-media-and-democracy [https://perma.cc/
TL7E-JNW8] (“[M]ost Americans believe it is now harder to be well-informed and to determine
which news is accurate. They increasingly perceive the media as biased and struggle to identify
objective news sources. They believe the media continue to have a critical role in our democracy
but are not very positive about how the media are fulfilling that role.”).
33 See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 100–01 (Roland
Gray comp., The MacMillan Co. 1921); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633,
633 (1995) (noting that, in “[t]he conventional picture of legal decisionmaking, . . . giving reasons is
both the norm and the ideal”). Admittedly, faced with the challenge of legal realism, even defenders
of the concept of ratio decidendi and precedential reasoning were forced to confront the limits of
the method. See Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J.
161, 182–83 (1930) (criticizing prevailing wisdom as to which part of a case’s reasoning is actually
precedential).
34 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88–89 (1935). The same is basically true of the
exclusionary rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961). For further discussion of this principle, see Augustine, To Consentius: Against Lying (H. Browne trans.), in 3 A SELECT LIBRARY
OF THE NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 481–500 (Philip
Schaff ed., 1887), which argues categorically against lying, even if it is to “unearth [heretics] out of
their hiding places,” id. at 481.
35 For an exploration of their relationship, see Lisa Kern Griffin, Honesty Without Truth: Lies,
Accuracy, and the Criminal Justice Process, 104 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 22, 23–25 (2018).
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can prioritize certain justifications for belief without violating core doctrinal and theoretical commitments. Perhaps most importantly, there is
a crucial difference between treating justifications as necessary and
treating them as aspirational. The JTB approach defended here is of
the latter variety: it makes knowledge the goal of the First Amendment,
not a prerequisite for constitutional coverage, just as the marketplace
model has truth as a lodestar but covers falsehoods as well. The point
in either case (or, for that matter, under other theories like those prioritizing democracy) is to focus on the goals of free speech, not to conflate
that end with a particular means.
This is not a purely normative, theoretical mission — it is intertwined with current doctrinal and scholarly controversies regarding
professional and expert speech, institutionalism, and a general focus on
social practices in First Amendment doctrine.36 From an epistemic
perspective, these debates look different through the JTB lens. There
might, for example, be a significant difference between a doctor and a
palm reader describing the outcome of a surgery, even if they say the
same thing and therefore have identical truth values. By privileging
justifications for true belief, the JTB lens could better account for the
constitutional status of professional speech and knowledge communities
like universities, and for the attention given to the mental states — for
example, internal justifications — of speakers and listeners.
Part I investigates the strengths and weaknesses of the standard epistemic theory of free speech — the marketplace model — and the ways
in which a thicker epistemology might preserve its core while incorporating many of the insights of alternative theories rooted in democracy
and individual autonomy. Part II attempts to situate the concept of
“knowledge” in the First Amendment, first by providing an account of
its constitutional value and then by considering various ways in which
courts could identify and protect proper justifications for beliefs without
running afoul of other First Amendment principles. It uses the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates
(NIFLA) v. Becerra37 to illustrate how the knowledge-based approach
might have done a better job than the marketplace model in evaluating
the constitutional status of professional speech.
It is important at the outset to clarify the scope of the argument.
Making justified true belief the central epistemic value of the First
Amendment could potentially help solve these and other problems of
doctrine and theory, but it would not necessarily involve a radical
revision, nor would it be applicable in all free speech scenarios. Like
the theory it seeks to amend — the marketplace of ideas — the JTB
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
36
37

See infra section II.B.2, pp. 482–86.
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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approach is most relevant in situations where the epistemic values of
free speech are in play, and that is not always the case. Art, political
opinion, and other important forms of free speech — or, for that matter,
epistemic claims made in public discourse38 — may be protected for
reasons not grounded in their “truth.”
The goal of this Article is not to solve the First Amendment’s epistemic crisis, but to suggest a new way to think about it. The Article’s
ultimate end is to convince readers that epistemic approaches to the
First Amendment should — subject to constraints — treat justified true
belief, rather than truth alone, as the lodestar of free speech values. Doing so would help address some of the deficiencies in the marketplace of
ideas model, while providing a richer account of the First Amendment’s
epistemic goals.
I. THE EPISTEMIC FIRST AMENDMENT
The central First Amendment debate is normative, foundational,
and unresolved: what is the constitutional value of free speech? The
volume of scholarly attention devoted to the question is almost incalculable, and though the question is to some degree insoluble, at its best the
discussion has been rich and productive39 — a model of the “marketplace of ideas” at work.
Inquiries into the First Amendment’s purpose are not solely the
realm of scholars and high theorists. Doctrinal questions like whether,
why, and to what extent the First Amendment protects artistic expression, commercial speech, or professional speech are hard to answer
based purely on constitutional text, history, or sometimes even precedent. They depend, in important ways, on normative suppositions
about the value of free speech.40
Free speech theories are often distinguished based on whether they
prioritize democracy, individual autonomy, or the marketplace of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
38
39

See POST, supra note 15, at 29–31, 43–47.
See Steven H. Shiffrin, Freedom of Speech and Two Types of Autonomy, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 337, 337 (2011) (“[S]ocial reality is too complex to hope or expect that First Amendment
theory could be reduced to a single value or small set of values. Nonetheless, extraordinarily fruitful
scholarship can be produced by those who try. Such scholarship can show just how far we can get
by resort to monistic approaches (as well as their limits).” (footnote omitted)).
40 See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE SPEECH
BEYOND WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15–148 (2017)
(canvassing doctrinal, social, and theoretical explanations for the protection of instrumental music,
nonrepresentational art, and nonsense); C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial
Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 985–86 (2009) (arguing that affording commercial speech protection is
inconsistent with the notion that constitutional protection of speech is intended to ensure
government respect for individual freedom and autonomy); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech,
125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241–42 (2016) (arguing that professions should be regarded as “knowledge
communities,” a designation that informs the justifications for and limits of speech freedom
and regulation).
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ideas.41 It is not my goal here to fully canvass those theories or choose
among them; I tend to share the view that there are multiple free speech
values.42 (It follows, and is worth emphasizing, that this Article does
not purport to present a single all-encompassing First Amendment
theory.) But recognizing the inevitability of coexistence and compromise
is perfectly consistent with efforts to sharpen and refine each of the
theories in response to criticism. Democracy-promoting theories, for
example, have been significantly enriched by efforts to explore not just
the value of “political speech” in a narrow sense,43 but the broader values of political equality, participation, and legitimation.44 The goal of
this Article is to provide a similarly enriching account of the First
Amendment in which the epistemic value of speech remains central.
A. The Standard Account: The Marketplace of Ideas Maximizes Truth
First Amendment theory is sometimes said to have started with
Justice Holmes’s paean to truth and free speech in his Abrams dissent.45
The central passage of that opinion, which many scholars and lawyers
probably know by heart, is among the most powerful and influential
ever penned by a Justice:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution.46

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
41 Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6–16 (2016) (identifying “the
most influential schools of free speech theory,” id. at 8, as the acquisition of truth, political speech,
and self-expression). In his masterwork, Thomas Emerson provided a slightly different list, specifically by dividing the “democracy” rationale into two. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970) (including self-fulfillment, discovering truth, providing
for decisional participation, and balancing political adaptability and stability).
42 See supra p. 443.
43 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 29 (1971) (arguing that the First Amendment covers only “criticisms of public officials and policies, proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional provisions and speech addressed to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country”).
44 See POST, supra note 15, at 27–60; James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central
Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 497–500 (2011).
45 See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 153 (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (noting that Justice Holmes “virtually invented both First Amendment
theory and First Amendment doctrine. He advanced the theory of the marketplace of ideas, and
he demonstrated how doctrine would have to evolve to implement this new theory”); Frederick
Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1278 n.97 (2005)
(noting the view that “the First Amendment started in 1919” when Abrams was penned).
46 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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What Justice Holmes meant by this “theory” remains the subject of
debate,47 but most take it to be an argument that open competition in
ideas is the best way to guarantee that “the truth will out.”48 That, at
least, is the version of the theory that tends to crop up in Supreme Court
opinions.49
Justice Holmes was not alone in this view. The “power of the
thought” he had “accepted” had been more or less identified in
Areopagitica by John Milton, who asked, “Let [Truth] and falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”50 Two centuries later, in Chapter 2 of On Liberty, John Stuart
Mill provided a more complete and full-throated defense of the principle, noting that “it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will
be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected
by the present.”51
As Professor Vincent Blasi has observed, Justice Holmes’s original
move, and perhaps his boldest claim, was that the theory he described
was in fact “the theory of our Constitution.”52 One can, however, find
plenty of support in American law and politics for the notion that the
competition of ideas will lead to truth. Defending the idea of religious
freedom, Thomas Jefferson wrote:
[T]ruth is great and will prevail, if left to herself; . . . she is the proper and
sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless
by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument
and debate; errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to
contradict them.53

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
47 Professor Vincent Blasi, for example, reads Justice Holmes’s commitment to free speech as
being more about individual character and social participation than about the pursuit, let alone
acquisition, of any objective “truth.” See infra section II.A.3, pp. 472–73. Others, including
Professor Frederick Schauer, argue that it is important to distinguish between claims about defining
the truth and claims about locating it. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Free Speech, the Search for
Truth, and the Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L. REV. 231, 236–37 (2017).
48 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 2.
49 See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 n.2;
see also, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who
won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine . . . .”).
50 MILTON, supra note 10, at 45; see also Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181
F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950) (“[T]ruth will be most likely to emerge, if no limitations are imposed upon
utterances . . . .”), aff’d, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); Walter Bagehot, The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration,
in 3 LITERARY STUDIES 204, 208 (Richard Hold Hutton ed., London, Longmans, Green, and Co.
1895) (“[I]n discussion truth has an advantage.”).
51 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859).
52 See Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes Through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1351–54 (1997).
53 2 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545, 546 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). The connection between truth-
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Professor Zechariah Chafee put the point similarly in Freedom of
Speech, published just a year after Abrams:
The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this. One of the most
important purposes of society and government is the discovery and spread
of truth on subjects of general concern. This is possible only through absolutely unlimited discussion, for . . . once force is thrown into the argument,
it becomes a matter of chance whether it is thrown on the false side or the
true, and truth loses all its natural advantage in the contest.54

One could go on multiplying examples.
Whether or not the marketplace was in fact the theory of our
Constitution in 1919, Abrams helped make it so going forward. Indeed,
Justice Holmes’s opinion has been called “the most powerful dissent in
American history.”55 Eight years after Abrams, Justice Brandeis extended Justice Holmes’s dissent (which Justice Brandeis had joined) in
his own concurring opinion in Whitney v. California56: “[F]reedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth.”57 In the case of bad ideas
or falsehoods, “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.”58 In the decades
since, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the “purpose of
the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”59
Most discussion and citation of Abrams has focused on what Justice
Holmes meant about the “competition of the market” and whether it is
indeed the “best test” of truth. But that elides a more fundamental
question: What did he mean by “truth”? It seems that Justice Holmes
did not intend to limit himself to narrowly objective truths. As discussed
in more detail below, he was skeptical that such truths exist.60 Instead,
he defined truth as a kind of “can’t help”:
[W]hen I say that a thing is true I only mean that I can’t help believing it —
but I have no grounds for assuming that my can’t helps are cosmic can’t
helps — and some reasons for thinking otherwise. I therefore define the

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
seeking in free speech and free exercise has been explored in depth by Professor William Marshall,
among others. William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 243 (1994).
54 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 34 (1920).
55 Andrew Cohen, The Most Powerful Dissent in American History, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 10,
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/08/the-most-powerful-dissent-in-americanhistory/278503/ [https://perma.cc/C5ER-LL2H]; see also THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT
DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND — AND CHANGED THE
HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2013); RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS:
THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (1987).
56 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
57 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
58 Id. at 377.
59 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
60 See infra note 182.
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truth as the system of my intellectual limitations — there being a tacit reference to what I bet is or will be the prevailing can’t help of the majority
of that part of the world that I count.61

What is striking about this passage is the degree to which it focuses
not on accuracy but on grounds for belief — on justifications, in other
words. In that sense, it broadens the frame in precisely the same way
as a knowledge-based account of the First Amendment. This understanding has been overshadowed by the competition-of-truths metaphor,
but a return to it might represent a better understanding of Justice
Holmes.
As Professor Bill Marshall puts it, “the oft-repeated metaphor that
the First Amendment fosters a marketplace of ideas that allows truth to
ultimately prevail over falsity has been virtually canonized.”62 But, in
keeping with its commitment to protecting actual blasphemy,63 First
Amendment theory subjects even its saints to criticism.
B. The Standard Critiques
All standard versions of the marketplace theory share two basic
premises: that truth is worth pursuing, and that the free exchange of
ideas is the best method of pursuit. It follows that the First Amendment
should generally be suspicious of speech restrictions, even well-intentioned
ones, as they will tend to frustrate the identification of truth. These two
premises — one establishing an end (truth), the other a means (free trade
in ideas) — have, in turn, been heavily criticized.
1. Internal: Speech Does Not Maximize Truth. — Perhaps the most
common critique of the marketplace model is that it provides a poor
means to achieve its own stated goal of discovering truth. These critiques are internal to the epistemic approach in that they all accept the
value of truth, and may even prize it especially highly. Their concern is
instrumental: that the marketplace of ideas cannot, in theory or in practice, achieve that value.
Some versions of this critique emphasize the ways in which “real”
markets and the marketplace of ideas are so fundamentally different
from one another that the “competition” Abrams celebrates is disconnected from the end it supposedly serves. The concepts of consumption
and price, for example, are foundational in economics but have no clear
analogue in free speech.64
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
61 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harold Joseph
Laski, Professor, London Sch. of Econ. (Jan. 11, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 248 (Mark
D. Howe ed., 1963) (cited in Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 11 n.36).
62 Marshall, supra note 3, at 1.
63 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952).
64 ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 203–04 (1999).
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Such objections can partially be met by revising the economic model
underlying the marketplace of ideas.65 But remapping the economic
theory of the marketplace of ideas does not avoid — and in fact can
exacerbate — other objections. For decades, scholars have pointed to
ways in which the “myth” of the well-functioning marketplace of ideas
papers over basic elements of human nature, psychology, and social organization.66 Like other markets, the marketplace of ideas is subject to
massive resource inequalities,67 racial and other biases,68 and irrational
behavior.69 The ascendance of behavioral economics and increased reliance on cognitive psychology in law70 have helped document the ways
in which individual and collective biases interfere with the ability to sort
and process truth.71 Some legal scholars have begun to investigate the
question empirically, and their findings — like those of scholars in other
disciplines — seem to confirm that more speech does not always necessarily lead to more truth.72
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
65 See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 4, at 822 (attempting to incorporate lessons from institutional
economics).
66 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964, 974 (1978) (“The assumptions on which the classic marketplace of ideas theory rests are
almost universally rejected today. Because of this failure of assumptions, the hope that the marketplace leads to truth, or even to the best or most desirable decision, becomes implausible.”); Frederick
Schauer, Social Epistemology, Holocaust Denial, and the Post-Millian Calculus, in THE CONTENT
AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH 129, 138 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012) (noting that
allowing expression of false ideas may “increase the number of people who hold false beliefs”).
67 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 66, at 965–66 (pointing to unequal presentation of viewpoints in
mass media); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 439, 445 (1995) (writing that, although “[i]deas are not as scarce as resources are, . . . there
may be scarcity in the available means for their dissemination”).
68 See, e.g., Shelly Chaiken, Communicator Physical Attractiveness and Persuasion, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1387, 1394 (1979) (“The present research indicates that physical
attractiveness can significantly enhance communicator persuasiveness.”); Richard Delgado, Campus
Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 385–86 (1991)
(arguing that racist speech distorts discourse by disempowering minority rebuttal, “a result at odds,
certainly, with marketplace theories of the first amendment”).
69 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1131 (1974) (observing that otherwise useful and rational decisionmaking heuristics lead to “systematic and predictable errors”).
70 See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473–74 (1998); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and
Economics 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12879, 2007),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w12879.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KJF-6KPY].
71 Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of
the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 673–96 (2006) (describing perceptual biases
that complicate the acquisition and processing of information).
72 Schauer noted the existence of this empirical question twenty years ago, and — working with
an empirical scholar — has recently tested it. Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160, 1160 (2015) (noting that there is “at best mixed support
for the [marketplace] metaphor’s veracity,” and reporting empirical study of “buffer zones” at polling places and abortion clinics); Frederick Schauer, Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1309, 1333 (1997) (“A great deal of free speech theory and a great deal of discourse
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One particularly noteworthy intervention in this regard has come
from feminist jurisprudence. Feminist critiques of free speech in the
context of pornography are well-known and controversial.73 The challenges those critiques pose to the marketplace of ideas might be less well
known.74 Feminist free speech scholars have done more than emphasize
the shortcomings of the standard model — they have proposed alternative accounts that treat truth not simply as propositional, but as relational75 and positional.76 This characterization of knowledge creation
as a social activity77 is hard to square with the traditional marketplace
model, given the latter’s focus on propositional truth, but it is perfectly
consistent with richer epistemological accounts that foreground the social practices justifying belief.78
In recent years, these long-simmering scholarly debates about the
marketplace of ideas have been inflamed both inside and outside the
academy by the perceived increase in public falsehoods, lies, and “fake
news.” Efforts to combat falsehoods with counterspeech, as the marketplace model mandates in all but the most limited of circumstances,79 do
not inspire much confidence. Many believe that President Donald
Trump rose to political power not just despite but partially because of
his penchant for lying and falsely accusing others of doing the same.80
Although many civil libertarians have rushed to the ramparts,81 some
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
theory is marked by an admirable epistemological optimism, but whether that epistemological optimism is well-founded is in the final analysis an empirical question, as to which the resources of
contemporary social science research might help to locate an answer.”).
73 See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
74 For a helpful overview, see generally Susan H. Williams, Essay, Feminist Jurisprudence and
Free Speech Theory, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1563 (1994).
75 See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Democracy, Freedom of Speech, and Feminist Theory: A
Response to Post and Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 603, 606 (2011) (“The feminist alternatives generally
involve relational models of truth, as opposed to the traditional, Cartesian model.”).
76 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 832 (1990)
(“Positionality rejects both the objectivism of whole, fixed, impartial truth and the relativism of
different-but-equal truths. It posits instead that being ‘correct’ in law is a function of being situated
in particular, partial perspectives upon which the individual is obligated to attempt to improve.”).
77 See Williams, supra note 74, at 1568.
78 See infra note 239 and accompanying text (describing social epistemology and institutional
approaches to the First Amendment, which similarly focus on truth-seeking as a social rather than
individual enterprise).
79 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended
is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.”).
80 See, e.g., Jeremy Adam Smith, How the Science of “Blue Lies” May Explain Trump’s Support,
SCI. AM.: GUEST BLOG (Mar. 24, 2017), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/how-thescience-of-blue-lies-may-explain-trumps-support/ [https://perma.cc/Q9WS-88DP].
81 See, e.g., Joel Lovell, Can the A.C.L.U. Become the N.R.A. for the Left?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(July 2, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2lOCs2m [https://perma.cc/UR6E-6SG6] (“Since Trump took office,
the A.C.L.U. has taken 170 ‘Trump-related legal actions.’”).

454

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 133:439

voices, particularly on the left, have condemned freedom of speech for
having enabled and perhaps even facilitated a crisis.82
One answer is that the arc of public discourse is long, but that it
eventually bends toward truth. Indeed, Justice Holmes’s own conception
of the move to truth was likely more evolutionary than revelatory — not
that individuals would frequently change their minds in response to new
ideas, but that, collectively, public discourse would shift in favor of truth.83
This account of the marketplace has the benefit of being more descriptively plausible, at the cost of being — almost in equal measure —
less normatively attractive. For one thing, it allows a great deal of harm
to be inflicted (likely against already marginalized groups) while speech
markets work themselves pure. Some current critiques of free speech
focus on the magnitude and unfairness of these costs.84
Advocates of the marketplace model have little choice but to concede
many of these points. It is undeniable that participants in the marketplace of ideas — like those in the “real” marketplace — are subject to a
host of biases, irrationalities, and cognitive failings that prevent them
from sorting truth from falsehood efficiently and effectively. To the
degree that the argument in favor of free speech is based on that instrumental value, it is an imperfect tool at best.
And yet the fallback position is still available: imperfect, perhaps,
but superior. Defenders of the marketplace, whether in goods and services or ideas, can and do argue that whatever its failings, free trade is
better than government action at delivering the ultimate goods desired,
whether they be economic efficiency or truth.85 This argument, based
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
82 See, e.g., Sarah Jones, How Donald Trump Poisons Free Speech, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 23,
2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/144471/donald-trump-poisons-free-speech [https://perma.cc/
FQ9S-8F2M] (“This is all compelling proof that [free speech] absolutists may have to re-examine
their arguments. Above all, Trump’s presidency supports the notion that no law, even when it is
enshrined in the Constitution, can alone justify an absolute position on free speech.”). Contemporary critiques of free speech protections for Trump and other members of the nationalist far-right
find antecedents in the works of 1930s theorists like Karl Loewenstein. See, e.g., Robert A. Khan,
Why Do Europeans Ban Hate Speech? A Debate Between Karl Loewenstein and Robert Post, 41
HOFSTRA L. REV. 545 (2013); cf. Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights,
I, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 423–24 (1937).
83 See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 26 (“[T]he
theory of evolution might help to explain why a robust freedom of speech can be extremely valuable
even when most individuals remain stubbornly impervious to demonstrably valid refutations of
their beliefs. . . . As the population changes with the infusion of new persons with different ideas,
the pattern of beliefs within the community changes, even if no single individual ever embraces a
new idea or discards an old one.”).
84 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 5 (2012); Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2326–
41 (1989); see also sources cited supra note 73 (feminist critiques).
85 See SCHAUER, supra note 17, at 34 (“The reason for preferring the marketplace of ideas to
the selection of truth by government may be less the proven ability of the former than it is the often
evidenced inability of the latter.”).
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on comparative advantage, permits the truth-seeking First Amendment
to weather a great many internal critiques while still retaining its
privileged position in free speech law and theory.86 The external critiques present a different type of challenge.
2. External: Truth Is Not the Central Value of Free Speech. — The
critiques described above, though powerful and sometimes designed to
dethrone the marketplace model, are “internal” to the epistemic theory.
They accept (or at least can accept) that truth is a fundamental goal,
while denying that unregulated speech is the right way to achieve it. A
more fundamental line of critique suggests that the theory not only has
malfunctioning means, but also the wrong end.87
Some of these “external” critiques begin by interrogating the notion
of truth itself and questioning whether it actually has real value unless
yoked to some other concept like power, or (more narrowly) whether its
value must give way to others like dignity.88 But most people readily
accept that truth either has intrinsic value89 or is so closely related to
other values (like the informed action to which Abrams alludes90) that a
theory attempting to maximize it is on the right track.
A related line of argument is that truth is neither objective91 nor
attainable,92 and that the marketplace therefore has no value. Even
accepting the minor premise, however, the major premise does not
necessarily follow. As Professor Kent Greenawalt puts it, “the truthdiscovery argument can survive a substantial dose of skepticism about
objective truth.”93 Indeed, as described in more detail below, Justice
Holmes himself seemed to share that skepticism, and yet — like the
pragmatists with whom he is often associated — he believed that one
can and should pursue the truth while (and by) continually subjecting
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
86 See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018)
(quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
87 Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance
and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 317 n.70 (1978) (noting that the Constitution does
not structurally support the idea that the goal of the First Amendment is the quest for truth).
88 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 699, 713–
24 (1991) (questioning the value of truth when it conflicts with other values).
89 See infra section II.A.1, pp. 465–70.
90 See infra section II.A.2, pp. 470–72. Recall that, just after invoking the “competition of the
market,” Justice Holmes declared that “truth is the only ground upon which [people’s] wishes safely
can be carried out.” Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
91 Ingber, supra note 49, at 25 (“[T]he assumption of the existence of objective truth is crucial to
classic marketplace theory, [but] almost no one believes in objective truth today.”); see also Baker,
supra note 66, at 974–81 (“The assumptions on which the classic marketplace of ideas theory rests
are almost universally rejected today. . . . First, truth is not objective.”).
92 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 617 (1982) (“[I]f we can
never attain the truth, why bother to continue the fruitless search?”).
93 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 132.
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received wisdom to testing.94 The search for truth itself can be
valuable;95 one can get closer to truth without entirely reaching it.96
Rather than making a frontal assault on truth and the pursuit
thereof, other scholars have argued that truth is simply not the central
value of the First Amendment. The entire realm of free speech theory
is far too broad to canvass, let alone explore in any detail. It is sensible
and common, however, to divide the other leading theories into two
classes: those that prioritize democracy, and those that focus on personal
In general, the political-democracy accounts often
autonomy.97
associated with Professor Alexander Meiklejohn prioritize the
importance of free speech to a well-functioning democracy.98 Such speech
often involves false or non-falsifiable statements of preference and
opinion. Autonomy-based theories focus more on the self-realization
and liberty of the individual speaker, not on whether speech advances
the collective search for propositional truths.99 This is of course a
necessary over-simplification, but the point of the discussion here is not
to give those theories their due, but only to show how they diverge from
the truth-seeking account.
But even if one accepts that there is a lexical priority to free speech
theory,100 and that democracy or autonomy must come ahead of truth,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
94 See generally Blasi, supra note 83 (discussing Justice Holmes’s relationships with pragmatist
philosophers).
95 See Marshall, supra note 3, at 4 (“[T]he attack misfires when it suggests that the First
Amendment value inherent in the search for truth exists only in its purported goal — the actual
finding of truth. The value that is to be realized is not in the possible attainment of truth, but
rather, in the existential value of the search itself.”).
96 See Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 132. The negative implication of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), is useful here — after all, the Supreme Court there denied constitutional coverage to “certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” that “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”
Id. at 571–72 (emphasis added).
97 See supra note 41 and sources cited therein.
98 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 88–98 (1948) (arguing, contra Justice Holmes, that the purpose of the First
Amendment is to protect self-government); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 22–23 (1993) (arguing that Madisonian ideas of democracy, rather
than free market principles, should shape First Amendment theory); Weinstein, supra note 44, at
491 (“[C]ontemporary American free speech doctrine is best explained as assuring the opportunity
for individuals to participate in the speech by which we govern ourselves.”).
99 See, e.g., SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 43 (“The first amendment may value participation and
freedom more than truth.”); C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1976) (arguing that the First Amendment protects a speaker’s selfrealization); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 216
(1972). Scanlon later abandoned this view. T.M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy
or Democracy?, 97 VA. L. REV. 541, 546 (2011).
100 See Post, supra note 19, at 1272–73.
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the epistemic value of free speech remains important.101 Autonomy
theorists do not necessarily need to rely on truth, though they need not
and generally do not discount its value. After all, in order to effectively
exercise autonomous choice, achieve self-realization, or engage in
self-expression, people typically count on reliable information.102
Conversely, being subjected to lies or falsehoods has long been
recognized — by Kant, most notably103 — as a threat to personhood.
For democracy theories, the importance of reliable information —
even “truth” — is more obvious. A well-functioning democracy, after
all, relies not just on people’s freedom to express their political opinions
and instincts, but on the availability of expertise and knowledge. The
most prominent and powerful recent explanation of this relationship appears in the work of Professor Robert Post, who argues that while the
animating value of the First Amendment is “democratic legitimation,”
which is rooted in the equality of speakers and ideas without regard to
truth or falsity,104 it also relies on the companion value of “democratic
competence,” meaning the “cognitive empowerment of persons within
public discourse, which in part depends on their access to disciplinary
knowledge.”105
The point is simply that democracy- and autonomy-based theories
can be understood in ways that preserve the importance and value of
truth. But why should they have to accommodate themselves to truth,
rather than the other way around? Can an epistemic approach to free
speech account for the values of democracy and autonomy?
Perhaps the most obvious move is to include “political truths” among
those that the marketplace is best suited to identify. After all, the
Framers described certain contestable political theories as being “truths”
that were “self-evident.”106 If that is the case — indeed, if those truths
are among the most important truths that the marketplace can identify
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
101 I believe that the converse is probably less true, at least for the simple marketplace model,
which can and perhaps does treat truth as intrinsically valuable and therefore does not need to
draw strength from democracy or autonomy approaches. The knowledge-based approach draws
much more heavily on — or at least is more compatible with — the other theories.
102 See David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of SelfDefining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 90–103 (2012) (focusing on ways in which lies might advance the autonomy interests of a lying speaker). For a similar argument focused on listeners, see
Alan K. Chen, Free Speech, Rational Deliberation, and Some Truths About Lies 4 (unpublished
draft) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library), for an argument that some forms of fake news
and other speech “might be understood to facilitate a type of listener self-realization that [Professor
Alan Chen] call[s] ‘expressive experiential autonomy.’”
103 Varat, supra note 16, at 1113 (“Some commentators have borrowed from Immanuel Kant to
urge that manipulative lies, at least, are incompatible with the respect for human autonomy underlying the First Amendment.”); see also SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 117–19.
104 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482, 484–85 (2011).
105 POST, supra note 15, at 34.
106 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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— then the truth-seeking and democracy-based approaches seem largely
to collapse into one another.107
But this co-opting solution is not entirely satisfying. Few people
think of the goals, let alone outputs, of politics as “truths” in the same
way as the “ideas” that battle for acceptance in the marketplace.
Though political debates are hopefully grounded in fact, and free speech
may be able to help in that regard,108 no amount of market-style
competition is likely to establish the “truth” of whether abortion or guns
should be further regulated, or whether the United States should
withdraw troops from Afghanistan, or whether the Senate should have
confirmed Judge Merrick Garland. Those resonate as normative issues
that, while crucially important, do not have truth value in the standard
sense.109
To some degree, this is simply a semantic debate, and there is no
point in trying to resolve it here. What matters for the current discussion is not conceptual precision (or accuracy, depending on whether one
thinks there is a truth of the matter to be established), but the considerable cost that it would impose on the marketplace theory to expand the
definition of truth in this way. For most people, the attraction of the
marketplace model is precisely its ability to develop and identify verifiable truths. If one expands the goals and functioning of the market to
encompass political beliefs and the like, then it starts to look a lot like
the market exists simply to label as “truth” whatever commands the majority’s support. That is a way to define truth, not to identify or, as
Justice Holmes said, “test” it.110
In sum, then, the marketplace model is in trouble. In part, it faces
rebellion from within, as scholars and others have justifiably pointed
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
107 The collapse need not be complete: it is possible that the real goal of a democratic theory
might be participation or legitimation or some value other than the advancement of any particular
“truths.” Whether this entails conflation of the two theories is debatable. See Schauer, supra note
88, at 704–05 (arguing that it does).
108 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 132 (“[D]iscourse certainly can test the coherence of value claims,
and can elucidate and clarify the values of a culture and of individuals.”).
109 I include the qualifying clause because I do not want to fully sideline the view that normative
statements — unlike, for example, commands — can have truth value. As a matter of doctrinal
hydraulics, however, forces tend to push in the other direction, “systematically transmut[ing] claims
of expert knowledge into assertions of opinion,” at least in public discourse. POST, supra note 15, at 44.
For example, the Supreme Court has confirmed that, in order to be actionable, “statement[s]
on matters of public concern must be provable as false.” Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S.
1, 19 (1990). Accordingly, full constitutional protection must be extended to subjective assertions
that do not articulate an objectively verifiable event. See id. at 20–22. Doubt is resolved in favor
of treating something like an opinion rather than a fact. See Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co., 22 F.3d
310, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that, where “it is highly debatable whether [a] statement is sufficiently verifiable to be actionable in defamation,” or “[w]here the question of truth or falsity is a
close one, a court should err on the side of nonactionability” (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
110 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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out its inability to deliver the value — truth — that it is supposedly
designed to maximize. Additionally, it is under siege from outside, as
competitor theories rooted in autonomy and democracy start to claim
more and more of the territory.
Perhaps most seriously, however, it faces neglect.111 This is doom in
scholarly circles, where the worst castle is one that nobody wants to
storm. But it also represents a missed opportunity and challenge for the
larger debate about free speech. Rarely has the relationship between
speech and truth been subject to a more searching public examination
than right now. And even those who defend free speech seem to do so
on nonepistemic grounds.
What connects many of the critiques and responses is a sense that
the marketplace model is simply not worth an enthusiastic defense. It
might be grudgingly invoked, but only alongside an enumeration of its
faults. The concept of “truth” seems flat, unless leavened with the inclusion of normative beliefs or an understanding that truth is relative
and socially determined — two moves that essentially answer the critiques by adopting them, thereby apparently giving up what made the
marketplace model attractive in the first place. Is it possible instead to
provide a thicker and more successful epistemological account of the
First Amendment?
This Article claims that it is. Epistemic defenses of speech can be
salvaged from the rubble of the traditional marketplace of ideas. This
does not mean giving up entirely on the ability or desirability of speech
as a mechanism of improving human understanding. It does, however,
mean recognizing that, in certain contexts and subject to certain constraints, the goal of free speech is not the maximization of truths in the
abstract, but rather the development of knowledge. Recreating First
Amendment theory and doctrine around justified true belief, rather than
truth alone, provides a more satisfying account of free speech and the
practices that sustain it. To understand why and how, it may help to
take a brief detour.
C. The Road to Larissa
In one of the most famous of the Socratic dialogues, Plato’s Meno,
Socrates discusses with Meno the nature of virtue and its relationship
to knowledge. Socrates gets Meno to agree that a person can lead
the way to the city of Larissa, “or anywhere else you like,” whether he
knows the way or instead simply happens to have a right opinion about
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
111 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 130 (“During most of the twentieth century, consequentialist
arguments [including truth-seeking] have dominated the discussion of freedom of speech, although
the last two decades have seen a resurgence of nonconsequentialist arguments cast in terms of basic
human rights and dignity.”).
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it.112 It would therefore seem that, so long as a man “has the right
opinion about that of which the other has knowledge, he will not be a
worse guide than the one who knows, as he has a true opinion, though
Meno then asks, reasonably enough, “why
not knowledge.”113
knowledge is prized far more highly than right opinion, and why they
are different.”114 Meno thus articulates both the crucial normative question — why is knowledge more valuable than true belief? — and the
definitional one — how is knowledge different from true belief?
The remainder of this Article will attempt to unpack both of those
questions in the context of the constitutional commitment to freedom of
speech. That context is important, for the goal here is not to advance
or even describe the past two-and-a-half millennia of epistemology. If
the inquiry is to be useful to the legal question of free speech, it must be
mediated through the First Amendment — the doctrines, practices, and
theories that together constitute the American system of free speech.
Part II attempts that task in some detail.
At the outset, however, it is important to establish why and how the
attempt is worthwhile. The world hardly lacks for First Amendment
theories, after all, and there is a very real risk that bringing more epistemology into the First Amendment will further muddle two already
complicated fields. The goal of this short section is simply to provide a
prima facie case that the concept of knowledge is sufficiently valuable
and distinct to merit the trip to Larissa.
The place to begin is with the first part of Meno’s question: What
makes knowledge “prized far more highly than right opinion”?115
Socrates’s primary answer is that knowledge is “tied down” in a way
that mere right opinion (that is, true belief) is not.116 He invokes the
sculptures of Daedalus, which were said to be mobile: To “acquire an
untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a runaway
slave, for it does not remain, but it is worth much if tied down.”117
He concluded by analogy:
[T]rue opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is
good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s
mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving)
an account of the reason why.118

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
112 PLATO, MENO 97a (G.M.A. Grube trans.), in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 870, 895 (John
M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchinson eds., 1997).
113 Id. at 97b, at 895.
114 Id. at 97d, at 895.
115 Id. Throughout this article, I follow Meno’s lead in asking the normative question before the
definitional one, though one could imagine asking them in either order — after all, the value of
“knowledge” surely depends on what one means by the term.
116 Id. at 97d, at 895.
117 Id. at 97d–98a, at 895.
118 Id.
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Socrates’s account thus provides one potential value proposition for
knowledge: the former is a surer and stabler guide to action than truth
alone. That argument is fully consistent with — indeed echoes — First
Amendment law and theory, at least to the extent that it connects belief
and action. Recall that the second and third of Justice Holmes’s
propositions in Abrams (following the “competition of the market”) were
that “truth is the only ground upon which . . . wishes safely can be carried out” and that this is “the theory of our Constitution.”119
The following Part considers this possibility in detail, along with
others that might ground the value of knowledge in its instrumental
relationship to the truth, its relevance to personal character, or its value
in checking state power. My goal here is simply to show that reorienting
the epistemic account of the First Amendment so as to focus on
knowledge rather than truth is worthwhile. In doing so, I depart a bit
from the existing literature. As noted above, the standard defense to
most attacks on the marketplace conception is to fall back on the
comparative argument. But that is both too much and too little of a
concession. What is needed is a fundamental reconsideration of the
epistemic ends of free speech, not just a contingent defense of its advantage as a means.
This is less an admission of defeat than an evolution in response to
justified criticism. After all, the marketplace theory itself is not immune
to the “competition” that it celebrates. Democracy- and autonomy-based
theorists have regularly fine-tuned their theories’ central goals, and the
epistemic First Amendment must similarly develop and grow if it is to
keep pace.
In that respect, it is worth noting that one common theme in the
evolution of free speech theories has been not only to focus on the
ultimate goods of democracy and autonomy, but also to emphasize the
foundations of those values. For democracy theorists, this often means
protecting not only political speech or democratic outcomes, but also the
mechanisms by which those outcomes are reached and justified — what
Post calls “democratic legitimation.”120 Some strains of autonomy
theory make similar moves by focusing on internal processes of thinking.121 What these accounts have in common is that they embed speech
in some other central value (democracy or autonomy) as both a means
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
119
120

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See POST, supra note 15, at 18. Post defines this term as the notion that “First Amendment
coverage should extend to all efforts deemed normatively necessary for influencing public opinion.”
Id. Even Meiklejohn casts his theory as defending the community’s “thinking process” from being
“mutilat[ed]” by the government. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1960) (emphasis omitted).
121 See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 298 (2011).
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and an end. It matters how we reach our democratic decisions, and it
matters how we achieve or express our autonomy.
The truth-seeking First Amendment generally lacks an analogous
account — an argument for why truth reached through free speech is
not only more likely but also more valuable than truth reached in some
other fashion. This gap leaves the marketplace model especially vulnerable to the empirical challenges described above. Some scholars have
responded by emphasizing the value of the search for truth122 or what
the competition of ideas means for character and culture.123
Those defenses, in turn, share a common and valuable theme: an
emphasis on ways of reaching (or at least seeking) the truth. Like the
democracy and autonomy variations discussed above, they focus on the
journey, rather than the destination. But that move seems harder for
truth-focused theories than for the alternatives. After all, democracy
and autonomy are practices, whereas the common understanding of
truth — even within First Amendment theories — is that it is an end.
How, then, can we account for the distinctive importance of reaching
truth in the right way?
This brings us back to Meno’s second question about knowledge and
true belief — “why they are different.”124 In Meno, Socrates says that
in order to constitute knowledge, right opinions must be “tied down.”125
Plato clarifies this concept in Theaetetus with the tripartite definition
that remains the starting point of epistemological discussion —
knowledge with “an account,” or justified true belief (JTB).126 The truth
condition is relatively uncontroversial; one cannot know something that
is false. The belief condition (that one must believe something in order
to know it) presents some complications, since one can imagine
situations in which a person correctly and with justification answers a
question without confidently believing herself to be correct.127
The vast majority of scholarship and debate, however, has been
about the justification condition: whether a justification is sufficient or
even necessary for knowledge, and — assuming a positive answer to one
of the first two questions — how to identify the kinds of justifications
that count. There are many ways to map that debate. Below, I follow
others by dividing the debate into “internal” accounts (those focusing on
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
122
123
124
125
126

See Marshall, supra note 3, at 4.
See Blasi, supra note 83, at 26.
PLATO, supra note 112, at 97d, at 895.
Id. at 97e, at 895.
See PLATO, THEAETETUS 202c (M.J. Levett & Myles Burnyeat trans.), in PLATO: COMPLETE
WORKS, supra note 112, at 157, 224 (“Now when a man gets a true judgment about something
without an account, his soul is in a state of truth as regards that thing, but he does not know it; for
someone who cannot give and take an account of a thing is ignorant about it. But when he has
also got an account of it, he is capable of all this and is made perfect in knowledge.”).
127 See, e.g., Colin Radford, Knowledge — By Examples, 27 ANALYSIS 1, 2–4 (1966).
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the reasoning of the individual) and “external” accounts (those requiring
justifications that might not be available to the individual).128
My goal is to suggest that the debate over proper justifications has
value for free speech theory, not to choose a side about which justifications (individual intellectual responsibility, disciplinarity, etc.) are to be
preferred. The range of justifications sufficient to transform a true belief into knowledge is potentially quite broad. One particularly demanding view is the Cartesian one: a belief is justified if and only if one has
an unshakable conviction about it.129 This view comes close to collapsing truth and justification into one another. An alternative approach,
commonly known as reliabilism, counts as justified those true beliefs
that emerge from cognitive processes that themselves tend to produce
truth.130 Reliance on perceptions, good reasoning, and professional
training might all satisfy that condition, whereas wishful thinking, motivated reasoning, and fabulism might not. Some philosophers argue to
the contrary that epistemic justification is not reliant on objective truth
frequency, and must instead be regarded as a “normative notion”131 —
a true belief is justified so long as it reflects the available evidence, however imperfect. There are innumerable variations on the theme.132
What connects them — and animates this Article — is the notion that
justifications matter.
Of course, as with any foundational philosophical definition, the JTB
approach is not perfect. Indeed, it is demonstrably incomplete, as
Professor Edmund Gettier showed with his proof that some justified
true beliefs (such as those resting on coincidence) are not knowledge.133
But it remains the default definition of knowledge, and a pretty good
one at that.134
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
128
129

See, e.g., Husak & Callender, supra note 24, at 46; Steup, supra note 23, § 2.3.
See Lex Newman, Descartes’ Epistemology, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2019 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/
entries/descartes-epistemology [https://perma.cc/Y2CY-MS54].
130 See, e.g., Alvin I. Goldman, What Is Justified Belief?, in JUSTIFICATION AND
KNOWLEDGE 1, 20 (George S. Pappas ed., 1979) (presenting this view as an alternative to
Descartes’s view); see also Cohen, supra note 25, at 280 (same).
131 Cohen, supra note 25, at 282, 285.
132 For a helpful overview, see Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, The Analysis of
Knowledge, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer
2018 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-analysis [https://perma.cc/
5N6J-JBL2].
133 See Gettier, supra note 26; see also Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1138, 1160 n.71 (1999) (book review) (“I think everyone agrees that Gettier ‘proved’ that
the analysis of ‘knowledge’ as ‘justified true belief’ does not work.” (citation omitted)).
134 See, e.g., John Turri, Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?, 184 SYNTHESE 247, 258 (2012)
(“There’s a reason why so many smart people found JTB so attractive for so long. Once we’re
convinced that JTB is false, the next most plausible explanation for the attraction is that JTB is
close to being true. And if my analysis here is correct, then JTB hit very close to the mark indeed.”).
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Focusing on justifications for truth means looking beyond the “competition” between ideas and taking into account their foundations: a consideration of the basis for our ideas, and not just their accuracy. Bringing this conception of knowledge into the First Amendment means
adjusting many existing frameworks, including the marketplace model.
But doing so might actually help preserve the epistemic and cognitive
values underlying the marketplace approach.
The road to Larissa, then, does not necessarily pass directly through
the marketplace, but neither does it depart entirely from the standard
materials of First Amendment law and theory. The remainder of this
Article will attempt to situate knowledge, and especially justification, as
a distinctly constitutional value. But as a starting point for that journey,
it may be helpful to remember that Justice Holmes himself seemed to
conceptualize truth as focusing not just on the destination — Larissa, as
it were — but also on the voyage itself. As he put it: “[a]ll I mean by
truth is the road I can’t help travelling.”135
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND DEFINITION
OF KNOWLEDGE
The first Part of this Article had three main goals: to distill the fundamental arguments in favor of the marketplace of ideas approach to
free speech, to acknowledge the strength and depth of the internal and
external objections to it, and to make a prima facie case that knowledge
has some appeal as an epistemic free speech value.
These points set up two tasks for the second Part: first, to defend
knowledge as a First Amendment value by establishing what is distinctively and constitutionally important about it, and second, to define it
by identifying what kinds of justification are constitutionally relevant.
Epistemologists could take these questions in either order, but in constructing a legal account of knowledge it makes sense to begin with the first.
To some degree, the focus on justifications should come naturally to
lawyers. In law, justifications are often as essential as accuracy, whether
in determining the culpability of a willfully ignorant defendant,136 assessing the qualifications of an expert witness,137 or limiting the use of
accurate and persuasive evidence that was unconstitutionally
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
135 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Georgina Pollock
(Oct. 27, 1901), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874–1932, at 100 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941)
(cited in Blasi, supra note 83, at 11 n.36); see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Assoc. Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court, to Frederick Pollock (June 17, 1908), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra,
at 139 (“[A]ll I mean by truth is what I can’t help thinking . . . .”) (cited in Blasi, supra note 83, at 11 n.36).
136 See Husak & Callender, supra note 24, at 41–53.
137 FED. R. EVID. 702 (permitting a person to testify as an expert witness if, inter alia, “the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods”).
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obtained.138 In all of those situations, true belief is not in question, and
yet the law may require proper justification as well. Showing that justifications are relevant to law is only the beginning, however. It remains
to be shown that they matter to the First Amendment in particular.
A. Knowledge as a First Amendment Value
In constructing a distinctively constitutional account of the value of
knowledge, it makes sense to start with existing First Amendment theories and materials. The discussion in Part I has already begun this
project by showing how a focus on justified true belief, rather than truth
alone, can help address some weaknesses of the marketplace approach,
while capitalizing on the strengths of competing theories rooted in democracy or personal autonomy.139 The task now is to make the connections more specific and concrete.
1. Knowledge as a Means to the Intrinsic Good of Truth. —
Knowledge is already partly embedded in the truth goal that has been
central to First Amendment jurisprudence. And the current crisis in
faith about truth as an end of First Amendment protection and theory
looks less problematic when we shift focus from truth to justified true
belief.
Invocations of Abrams tend to focus on the marketplace mechanism
for establishing and identifying truth, rather than on what Justice
Holmes suggests about why truth matters. This traditional approach
invites the kinds of instrumental critiques discussed above, while failing
to fully justify the epistemic goal. A close reading of the passage, however, suggests not only a mechanism but also an underlying value:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution.140

What is the “ultimate good” to which Justice Holmes refers? One
possibility — the one that most readers probably assume — is truth
itself. Perhaps, like equality or liberty or some other potential sovereign
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
138 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (“The tendency of those who execute the
criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of
the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people
of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.”).
139 See supra section I.C, pp. 459–64.
140 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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virtues,141 truth is a virtue that society is obligated to pursue for its own
sake.142 At some basic level, this seems uncontroversial, as there is
broad agreement that the advancement of truth is a value,143 even if not
the central value, of the First Amendment.144
One argument for knowledge as a First Amendment value, then,
could be that it is instrumentally valuable for maximizing truth. People
committed to proper justifications for true belief might be better motivated or better able to identify truth — in fact, for some epistemologists,
this point is basically definitional.145 As Plato put it: “[S]omeone who
loves learning must above all strive for every kind of truth from
childhood on.”146 Plato might not have meant knowledge in the JTB
sense (the quote comes from Republic rather than Meno or Theaetetus),
but the point is widely accepted, if not easy to empirically verify, that
falsity prospers where knowledge practices do not.147 It seems plausible,
then, that pursuing the proper justifications (scholarly discipline, etc.)
tends to lead to truth. After all, sometimes the best or even only way to
reach an end like being healthy is by cultivating particular means like
healthy eating.
On that note, it is worth emphasizing that, even on the most barebones account of the marketplace model, what really matters are not
true propositions but true beliefs. The fact or breadth of belief might
be irrelevant to whether a proposition is true,148 but it is immensely
important to the normative evaluation of free speech as a social practice.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
141

See generally RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
EQUALITY (2000) (arguing that equal respect and treatment of citizens are the central virtues
of democratic sovereignty).
142 See Marshall, supra note 3, at 27 (“It is not an overstatement to note that the concern with
truth has dominated the Western intellectual tradition.”).
143 Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate Speech About Science, 106 GEO. L.J. 447, 464–71
(2018) (“[T]he notion that truth has intrinsic epistemic value is widely accepted.” Id. at 465.);
Schauer, supra note 8, at 902 (“[I]t seems relatively uncontroversial to assert that, in general, truth
is, ceteris paribus, better than falsity, that knowledge is, ceteris paribus, better than ignorance, and
that a society with more true belief is, ceteris paribus, better than one with less belief in the truth
or than one with more beliefs that are actually false.”); Schauer, supra note 88, at 704 (“The proposition
that truth is necessarily and always valuable has been implicit in centuries of free speech theory.”).
144 See supra section I.B.2, pp. 455–459.
145 See infra notes 251–253 and accompanying text (discussing reliabilism and related approaches).
146 PLATO, REPUBLIC bk. IV, 485d (G.M.A. Grube & C.D.C. Reeve trans.), in PLATO:
COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 112, at 971, 1109.
147 See Alvin I. Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas,
2 LEGAL THEORY 1, 12 (1996) (arguing that “domains where maximum error and falsity are to be
found . . . are precisely the ones relatively unserviced by formal education”).
148 Of course, even this statement is not true if one defines truth as majority belief, as a thin
reading of Justice Holmes might suggest. But it seems unlikely that this definition is the First
Amendment’s conception of truth. Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (“[A] State is, ordinarily, denied the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught
with evil consequence.”).
OF

2019]

FREE SPEECH AND JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF

467

Put another way: What is the value of a truth that no one believes? The
whole point of the connection between truth and free speech is to increase the identification, understanding, and belief of those truths.149
Recognizing the difference between truths and true beliefs is important, in part because it helps illustrate the point that one does not
necessarily maximize true beliefs — or even truths — by flooding the
market with true statements. The availability and accessibility of truths
are not enough for them to “get . . . accepted in the competition of the
market,”150 if consumers in that market are not willing or able to accept
them. Indeed, Justice Holmes himself recognized as much: “One thinks
that an error exposed is dead, but exposure amounts to nothing when
people want to believe.”151
Consider (it shouldn’t be hard) a world in which more truths are
available than ever before, but are often washed away on waves of falsehood. With unimaginable amounts of information at our literal fingertips (and arguably within our “extended” minds152) there is nonetheless
a pervasive sense of disquiet that we, as individuals and as a collective,
are facing something like an epistemic crisis. The sheer volume of information may overwhelm our ability to categorize, process, sort, and
remember. The proliferation of falsehoods makes it hard to trust any
idea, which in turn saps people’s ability and willpower to engage in the
kinds of debate that might put truth and falsehood to the test. The
ability to find information that confirms our initial judgments makes it
harder to engage with challenging ideas, and all too easy to simply
deepen our social or cognitive biases.153 The degradation of our attention
spans makes it hard to engage in deep thinking or learning.154 And so on.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
149 Schauer, supra note 88, at 707 (“[T]he argument from truth is essentially an argument from
knowledge. The value asserted by the argument from truth is the value of having people believe
things that are in fact true. Truth, after all, is a property of a proposition and has little to do with
human action or belief.”).
150 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
151 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Frederick Pollock
(Aug. 30, 1914), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 135, at 219 (cited in Blasi, supra
note 83, at 26 n.95).
152 The question of knowledge and extended minds as they relate to the First Amendment is itself
an interesting and important one. See, e.g., Betsy Sparrow et al., Google Effects on Memory:
Cognitive Consequences of Having Information at Our Fingertips, 333 SCIENCE 776, 778 (2011)
(observing that study participants are more likely to recall “where” on a computer a piece of
information is stored than “what” it is).
153 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 69, at 1127–28 (discussing the tendency of people to
utilize availability heuristics, which are facilitated by the easy availability of information).
154 See generally TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS (2016) (claiming that the modern
attention span is decreasing steadily in the wake of overstimulation by mass media and information
penetration). But see Simon Maybin, Busting the Attention Span Myth, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-38896790 [https://perma.cc/6GSK-NMMV] (arguing that
there is no conclusive proof that attention spans are declining).
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But it is hard to cast these as problems within the traditional marketplace model, which tends to treat the proliferation of ideas as, if not
an unqualified-albeit-instrumental good, at the very least a necessary
evil. There can indeed be situations in which the search for ideas is selfdefeating, but for the most part — as with economic markets — a
broader and deeper market is likely to be more efficient and effective.
On the JTB account, however, the sheer volume of information is
not an unalloyed good. What matters is the maximization of knowledge,
which includes not only the volume of truths but also the quantity and
quality of justifications — bases for believing those truths. Strengthening
shared commitments to justifications of true belief, moreover, can help
overcome some (albeit not all155) of those cognitive biases and thereby
facilitate the spread of truth itself.
Mechanisms of knowledge might also improve the proportion of beliefs that are truthful. There is, after all, a difference between simply
maximizing the total amount of truths available and finding the most
desirable equilibrium between true and false beliefs. As Professors
Alvin Goldman and James Cox put it:
Each agent’s quantity of truth possession might be represented by his or her
ratio of true beliefs to true-beliefs-plus-false-beliefs, or perhaps the ratio of
true beliefs to true-beliefs-plus-false-beliefs-plus-no-opinions. . . . [T]he social ratio would be the total number of true beliefs (or believings) by members of society divided by the total number of true beliefs, false beliefs, and
no opinions.156

This is an important distinction that is sometimes elided in the debate
about the marketplace model, where the battle tends to be about
whether the free exchange of ideas maximizes truth or falsehood, as if
those are the only two options and the size of the overall set of beliefs is
fixed. In actuality, there is no necessary “cap” on the number of beliefs,
and so the proportion between true and false beliefs is itself potentially
as important as the total amount of true beliefs. A person (or society)
with ten true beliefs and one hundred false ones might be far worse off
than one with nine true beliefs and no false ones.
A great deal of current First Amendment scholarship focuses on the
phenomenon of “fake news.”157 As with countless other free speech controversies in the past (Nazis in Skokie and the like), one gets the sense
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
155 Racism and other prejudicial beliefs are not purely cognitive problems, and so cannot be
entirely fixed by more or better thinking. See, e.g., Stuart Hall, Signification, Representation,
Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates, 2 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 91, 108–
13 (1985) (arguing that race as an ideological category is overdetermined by its relation to other
contested economic, political, and cultural practices and structures).
156 Goldman & Cox, supra note 147, at 5.
157 Although it undoubtedly owes much to President Trump, the surge actually began before his
presidency. See Horwitz, supra note 21, at 462 (noting, in 2012, that “[i]t is unsurprising that these
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that scholars have little personal sympathy with the purveyors of fake
news, but that those same scholars often conclude — sometimes but not
always grudgingly158 — that fake news is nonetheless generally protected by the First Amendment.159 After all, the whole point of the
epistemic model of free speech is that “the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.”160
Sometimes fake news and related phenomena are described as evidence of a “post-truth” era, or a society “in which truth seems to matter
so little.”161 But the “post-truth” label can obscure something important
about the people who believe fake news, lies, conspiracies, and other
demonstrably false notions: they do not necessarily deny the value of
truth.162 Quite to the contrary, many believe themselves to be in possession of it, and that it has power, which is why President Trump goes
to such great lengths to brand unwanted stories as “fake news.”163 One
cannot combat the phenomenon, then, by simply insisting on the value
of truth.
What is missing is not a belief in the importance of truth, but declining faith in — and increasing disagreement about — the disciplines,
institutions, and practices of knowledge.164 The underlying debate is
about which sources and justifications for belief are valid: media, universities, churches, personal intuition, and so on. That discussion is not
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
sorts of epistemological questions have interested First Amendment scholars” and that “[w]hat is
more surprising, perhaps, is the sudden intensity of this interest”).
158 See sources cited supra note 102 (defending constitutional value of lying as a means of advancing speaker and listener autonomy).
159 See Clay Calvert & Austin Vining, Filtering Fake News Through a Lens of Supreme Court
Observations and Adages, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 153, 156–58 (2018); Mark Verstraete & Derek
E. Bambauer, Ecosystem of Distrust, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 129, 147–52 (2018) (sounding a
“cautionary note on interventions,” id. at 147).
160 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
161 Schauer, supra note 8, at 919.
162 This view does not apply to everyone involved in the phenomenon of fake news. Trolls,
saboteurs, and others might very well be committed to purposeful attacks on what they know to be
truths. I will not address the constitutional status of such speech in any detail here, except to note
that the First Amendment protects a great many lies, but also permits liability for certain falsehoods
uttered with a culpable mental state. The “speech” of algorithms, bots, and other nonhumans also
raises threshold questions not addressed here. For more comprehensive accounts of some of these
issues, see Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1447 (2013)
(arguing that the outputs of “most algorithmic-based editing” are speech for the purposes of the
First Amendment); Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA . L. REV. 1495, 1517–24 (2013) (arguing
for the usefulness of a “functionality doctrine” in considering the application of First Amendment
protection in an increasingly algorithmic world, id. at 1518).
163 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2018, 5:38 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/965943827931549696 [https://perma.cc/94XR-VCDV]
(“I have been much tougher on Russia than Obama, just look at the facts. Total Fake News!”).
164 Cf. John O. McGinnis, A Politics of Knowledge, NAT’L AFF., Winter 2012, at 58, 59 (contrasting an “outdated approach” in which “analysis of potential improvements was to come from
the top, foisted upon the public by experts and bureaucrats” with a “technological acceleration that
provides new mechanisms for creating social knowledge”).
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a debate about the value of truth, but about where it is to be found.
What justifications can or should be privileged over others is a difficult
but unavoidable question, addressed in part below.165
Moreover, some truths may be more significant than others.166 The
kinds of truths that one finds in the online marketplace of ideas, for
example, might be precisely the kinds of accurate but trivial facts that
contribute nothing to personal or social flourishing. By contrast, true
beliefs acquired through the development of expertise could be the kinds
that most people intuitively regard as more valuable.
Of course, this is a normative statement — inevitably so; the basic
question is one of value, after all. And to fully defend it would require
a more precise account of the kinds of knowledge that an individual or
society might prize (scientific, medical, and so on). My point here is only
the general one that knowledge, rather than truth, might better capture
the epistemic values that most people really want from free speech: not
only quantity, but also quality, of information.
2. Knowledge as a Guide to Action. — Similarly, knowledge fits into
current First Amendment theory because it is a guide to action, a preoccupation of truth-based models starting with Abrams itself.
Although most people probably agree that truth has some intrinsic
value — that, all else equal, more truth is generally better than less —
true beliefs are also important because they serve as a guide to informed
action.167 People act on their beliefs, and when those beliefs are false
they are likely to make worse decisions. When people come to believe
that Democratic leaders are operating a child sex ring out of the basement of a D.C. pizza parlor,168 or that vaccines cause autism,169 and
then act on those demonstrably incorrect beliefs, they often harm themselves and others in the process.
The importance of the relationship between truth and action was
emphasized in Abrams. After stipulating the value of “competition” in
identifying truth — the heart of the standard marketplace model —
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
165
166

See infra section II.B, pp. 476-86.
Goldman & Cox, supra note 147, at 6 (“[I]t seems implausible to weight all propositions
equally. Believing a (true) law of physics or a (true) economic principle intuitively seems like a more
significant cognitive accomplishment than believing a more humdrum truth.”).
167 See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment,
105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1991) (“The First Amendment is based on the belief that people will
make better decisions if they are more fully informed.”); cf. Paul A. David & Dominique Foray,
Economic Fundamentals of the Knowledge Society, 1 POL’Y FUTURES EDUC. 20, 25 (2003)
(defining knowledge as a quality that “empowers its possessors with the capacity for intellectual or
physical action”).
168 See Amanda Robb, Anatomy of a Fake News Scandal, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 16, 2017, 3:07
PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/pizzagate-anatomy-of-a-fake-news-scandal-w511904
[https://perma.cc/Z7VK-824K].
169 See Peter J. Hotez, How the Anti-Vaxxers Are Winning, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2k1LpSB [https://perma.cc/Q7SR-PLXN].
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Justice Holmes went on to say that “truth is the only ground upon
which . . . wishes safely can be carried out” and that this is a part of “the
theory of our Constitution.”170 On this vision, truth might not be valuable intrinsically, but as a basis for action — individual, perhaps, but
also collective. Justice Holmes would later reemphasize the tight connection between truth, belief, and action in Gitlow v. New York,171 arguing that an idea “offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on
unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the
movement at its birth.”172
Recall that Meno’s question for Socrates was what makes knowledge
more valuable than true belief alone. Socrates’s answer was that
knowledge is fastened or “tied down” in a way that makes it a more
effective basis for action.173 A person who knows the way to Larissa is
more likely to make it there, since mere true belief is more brittle and
can be shaken — it has no foundation of justification on which to rest.
If the purpose of true belief is to guide action, and knowledge does
so better than true belief alone, then Socrates’s answer to Meno is also
the answer to our constitutional question: knowledge is to be preferred
to truth alone because it is a better guide to action. A person or society174 in possession of knowledge will stay the course — will reach
Larissa — more dependably.
This conclusion is consistent with the fact that truth-based accounts
of the First Amendment often point to the instrumental value of truth
as a guide to action. A standard argument in favor of constitutional
coverage for commercial speech, for example, is that it provides the kind
of information that consumers need in order to make decisions.175 The
competition of the marketplace — which in the case of commercial
speech is both metaphorical and real — will help ensure that the
information is true. But when it comes to certain kinds of speech —
those made in the context of a professional relationship, for example176 —
accuracy is not left to the market. As Professor Claudia Haupt notes:
“T]he state may ensure that clients seeking professional advice are not
harmed by ‘false’ ideas by way of imposing professional malpractice
liability.”177 The link between information, understanding, and action
in such contexts is such that law may legitimately intervene.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
170
171
172
173
174

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
PLATO, MENO at 97e, in PLATO: COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 112, at 895.
See Schauer, supra note 47, at 232 (exploring the distinction between individual and collective
knowledge).
175 For an early exploration, see Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432–33 (1971).
176 See infra section II.C, pp. 486–496.
177 Haupt, supra note 40, at 1274.
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Again, of course, there are normative questions and assumptions
lurking. Designing First Amendment doctrine so as to privilege
knowledge will incentivize and enable certain kinds of action over others — those that accord with whatever justifications the law recognizes.178 To take just one example, Professor Paul Horwitz notes that,
on one view: “[A]cademic freedom is prized primarily because its contribution to truth-seeking will yield discoveries or insights that . . . benefit
society at large.”179
There are serious questions about which practices and institutions
deserve this kind of deference.180 But at a general level, as with the
argument that truth is generally better than falsehood, it seems relatively
safe to say that truth-guided actions will generally be better than those
guided by falsehood. And if knowledge does a better job than true belief
alone at maintaining the link between truth and action, then there is
good reason for a system of free speech to prize it.
3. Truth, Knowledge, and Character. — Focusing on justified true
belief, rather than truth proper, explicitly foregrounds the emphasis —
already present in First Amendment theory — on the process of truthseeking. Indeed, one reading of Justice Holmes is that he was not concerned so much with the value of truth as a basis for action as he was
with the competition of the market itself, and the kinds of values it demands and develops, such as determination, drive, and a constant
searching for the transcendent (leavened with the knowledge that it may
be unattainable).181 On this view, the main benefits of the search for
truth are the values that it inculcates, not the destination it reaches.
As noted above, the standard account of the marketplace of ideas is
that it provides the best means of developing and identifying truths. But
Justice Holmes himself was not confident that any single “truth” was
waiting to be discovered. As Blasi explains:
Holmes certainly was a pluralist. Throughout his adult life, in a variety of
intellectual endeavors, he displayed an instinctive aversion to assertions of
“absolute” truth. He wrote to John Wu: “I don’t believe or know anything
about absolute truth.” He once described truth as “the majority vote of that
nation that could lick all others.”182

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
178 Cf. Schauer, supra note 88, at 709 (“[T]he argument from truth as an argument for freedom of
speech and freedom of the press is parasitic on a theory of value or a theory of the good as to which
knowledge is instrumental.”).
179 Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 484 (2005); see also Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding that “academic freedom . . .
is . . . a special concern of the First Amendment” because “[t]he Nation's future depends” on children being given “wide exposure to [a] robust exchange of ideas”).
180 See infra section II.B, pp. 476–86.
181 Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill’s and
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 66–67 (2010).
182 See Blasi, supra note 83, at 14 (footnotes omitted).
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One way to read this passage is as defining truth simply as whatever
emerges from the marketplace of ideas. But that definition would make
the relationship between truth and the marketplace more tautological
than teleological. If truth just is what the marketplace produces, then
it is hard to see how it functions as an independent value sufficient to
justify reliance on the marketplace.
That result can be avoided if one understands Justice Holmes’s goal
not as defining particular objective and consistent truths, but as requiring continual testing and retesting of ideas and ideals — a marketplace,
more than a market, as Blasi puts it.183 Blasi argues that Abrams “contains the seeds of an understanding of the First Amendment that has
more to do with checking, character, and culture than with the implausible vision of a self-correcting, knowledge-maximizing, judgmentoptimizing, consent-generating, and participation-enabling social mechanism.”184 Bill Marshall makes a similar move in his influential defense
of the marketplace model, arguing that the “value that is to be realized
is not in the possible attainment of truth, but rather, in the existential
value of the search itself.”185 Both of these arguments emphasize the
process of truth-seeking, not just the value of true beliefs themselves.
The knowledge-based approach to the First Amendment similarly
emphasizes not just the outcomes of free speech, but also the value of
certain modes and habits of thinking. In practice, the two will sometimes overlap. Good justifications might be only those that reliably lead
to truth. In any event, to the degree that Abrams is about habits of mind
and character, rather than truths, it fits more comfortably with a focus
on knowledge than on truth alone.
4. Truth and the Role of the State. — A knowledge-based account
of the First Amendment also helps answer a puzzle that the truth-centric
approach stops short of addressing: If truth is the goal of First
Amendment protection, why not allow speech regulation in specific areas where the government almost certainly has a comparative advantage in assuring or identifying verifiable truths?
The answer to this question is not entirely satisfying from within the
marketplace model. Justice Holmes’s claim that the “best test” of
truth is to get itself accepted in the marketplace of ideas is generally understood as an argument that the marketplace of ideas will be more accurate
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
183 Id. at 13 (“Perhaps the imagery that we should take from Holmes’s figure of speech is not
that of a highly structured price-determining market such as a stock exchange, a mechanism designed to achieve plebiscitary and transactional precision, but rather a choice-proliferating marketplace, a site for spontaneous and promiscuous browsing, comparing, tasting, and wishing, a paean
to peripatetic subjectivity amid abundance.”).
184 Id. at 2. Blasi somewhat discounts the First Amendment’s “knowledge-maximizing” function,
but I do not read him to be using “knowledge” in the way I am here.
185 Marshall, supra note 3, at 4. But see Schauer, supra note 88, at 704–08 (arguing that the
search for truth has no intrinsic value).
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than the state — that it will sort truths from falsehoods with fewer false
positives and false negatives.186 This argument is an empirical one and is
subject to all the concerns, weaknesses, and objections canvassed above.187
A knowledge-based First Amendment might be able to fill the gap.
On this approach, the question is not the simple empirical issue of how
many truths are available, but what justifications are available for believing them. Obviously, this entails identifying which justifications are
appropriate and which are not — a project that Part II begins — but it
is not hard to imagine that “because the government said so” would head
the list of improper justifications.188 It is unacceptable because the state
cannot oversee truth-seeking without eroding other underlying First
Amendment values. The concern is not whether the government can do
a more accurate job in identifying truth (the standard marketplace
argument), but whether its efforts to do so will trample on other important free speech principles.
Consider the constitutional limitations on the government’s power to
punish or prevent false speech.189 For the most part (commercial speech
is a bit of an exception190), the First Amendment prevents this kind of
regulation.191 But why? Justice Holmes’s argument that the “best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market” might be convincing in general, but surely
not in cases where undoubtedly false statements are in play. Indeed, the
Supreme Court itself has often said that “there is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact,”192 and that such statements “are particularly
valueless” precisely because “they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.”193
And yet, when faced with a case involving a statute punishing a
limited set of such undeniably false statements, the Court struck down
the law on First Amendment grounds. In United States v. Alvarez,194
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
186
187
188

See supra pp. 448–49.
See supra section I.B, pp. 451–59.
Cf. Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths,
36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2008) (arguing that government has no “legal authority to identify and
enforce any particular version of right and wrong, or truth and untruth”).
189 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
190 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (“For commercial
speech to [be constitutionally protected], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.”).
191 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion) (striking down the Stolen
Valor Act, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 Stat. 3266 (2006), which criminalized false claims about having
military medals).
192 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); see also, e.g., Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 746
(Alito, J., dissenting) (collecting cases); BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002)
(“[F]alse statements may be unprotected for their own sake . . . .”); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,
171 (1979) (“Spreading false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment credentials.”).
193 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
194 567 U.S. 709.
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the petitioner had been convicted of violating the Stolen Valor Act,195
which criminalized false claims of having received the Congressional
Medal of Honor.196 There was no doubt that the petitioner had lied and
no real defense of his lie’s value.197 A majority of the Court even
acknowledged that the falsity of speech had counted against its constitutional protection in some cases.198 Ultimately, the Court’s decision
seemed to rest on its view that only a stronger historical tradition could
justify the law.199 Whatever one thinks of the Court’s recent turn to
historical categoricalism in First Amendment cases,200 it must be said
that it does not flow naturally or neatly from a commitment to the
marketplace of ideas.
A knowledge-based approach could have provided a broader and
more satisfying epistemic account. Focusing on the inappropriateness
of the law as a tool (again, not because it is blunt, but because it is
forbidden) helps make sense of the fact that the Supreme Court has consistently extended constitutional protection to false statements201 despite
insisting that they have no value.202 One way to reconcile those seemingly conflicting principles is to understand the former as an instantiation of the rule that the government simply cannot prohibit falsehoods,
even if it can identify them accurately and even if they have no value.
True beliefs have less value if they are a result of government regulation.
This is not inconsistent with Alvarez, to be clear — it is an alternative
way of understanding the epistemic values at work.
In fact, it might provide a better account of some aspects of the decision, including the plurality’s repeated invocation of the concept of
“integrity.” The Court insisted that “[t]he Government’s interest in protecting the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question.”203 But
what does “integrity” mean in this context? The Court invoked the same
concept in the course of noting that prohibitions on perjury similarly
punish a particular kind of false speech, and have been upheld on a
similar integrity-based rationale: “To uphold the integrity of our trial
system, . . . the constitutionality of perjury statutes is unquestioned.”204
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
195
196
197

Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 Stat. 3266 (2006).
Id. at 713 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 753 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Neither of the two opinions endorsed by Justices in the
majority claims that the false statements covered by the Stolen Valor Act possess either intrinsic or
instrumental value.”).
198 Id. at 719 (plurality opinion) (noting that, under current doctrine, falsity is “not irrelevant”);
id. at 732–33 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that “this Court has frequently said or implied that
false factual statements enjoy little First Amendment protection”).
199 Id. at 717–18 (plurality opinion) (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)).
200 For a critical assessment of Stevens’s historical categoricalism, see Genevieve Lakier, The
Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2212–32 (2015).
201 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 715 (plurality opinion); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80
(1964) (allowing liability only for knowing or reckless falsehoods).
202 See supra p. 474.
203 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 725 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
204 United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993).
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This is notable precisely because the protection of integrity is different
from the pursuit of truth and is actionable even if it leads a jury to
believe, accurately, that a particular defendant is guilty. The harm has
to do with processes of belief — with justifications, in other words.
All of the examples described in the preceding four sections help show
ways in which an account of free speech that focuses on justified true belief
already exists in the doctrine — and in some cases better explains its complexities — than an account focused more simplistically on “truth.”
B. Mapping a Knowledge-Based First Amendment:
What Justifications Count?
The discussion up until this point has attempted to show that there is a
difference between truth and knowledge, and that there are good reasons
to take the latter seriously as an important and distinct First Amendment
value. But what is, or should be, the First Amendment’s theory of
knowledge? What kinds of justifications are constitutionally relevant?
The answers to these questions must come from within law.205 A
constitutional theory of free speech that represented the cutting edge of
epistemological thinking but failed to account for our actual First
Amendment practice would be no constitutional theory at all. The goal
of this section is to show how various aspects of free speech theory and
doctrine can — and in some ways already do — account for knowledge
as a constitutional value. My purpose here is only to show that
justifications are important and that they might plausibly be identifiable,206 not to resolve which justifications count. After all, epistemologists, whose entire field is devoted to these questions, and who — unlike
legal scholars — are relatively unencumbered by precedent, have yet to
settle on which justifications transform a belief into knowledge.207 Some
epistemologists define it to mean true belief alone,208 or true belief that
is “safe”209 or “sensitive”210 in an epistemological sense. One might
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
205 Cf. Husak & Callender, supra note 24, at 48 (“The conception of justification typically employed
by philosophers is idealized, and may be unsuitable for purposes of imposing criminal liability.”).
206 See id. at 45 (“The mental state of knowledge was hence identified with an agent correctly
believing a proposition for which he possessed good evidence. Exactly what form good evidence
would take was again controversial, but for present purposes an intuitive understanding of
‘evidence’ is more than sufficient.”).
207 Christian Turner, The Burden of Knowledge, 43 GA. L. REV. 297, 303–04 (2009) (“It is highly
contested precisely what kind of truth and what kind of justifications, whether in the form of pure
logical entailment or mere evidence, are needed to elevate a mere belief to the special, objective
status of knowledge.”).
208 See Crispin Sartwell, Knowledge Is Merely True Belief, 28 AM. PHIL. Q. 157 (1991); Crispin
Sartwell, Why Knowledge Is Merely True Belief, 89 J. PHIL. 167 (1992).
209 See, e.g., Ernest Sosa, How to Defeat Opposition to Moore, 13 PHIL. PERSP. 141, 142 (1999).
210 See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 25, at 172–78; see also Kelly Becker & Tim Black, The
Resilience of Sensitivity, in THE SENSITIVITY PRINCIPLE IN EPISTEMOLOGY 1, 1 (Kelly
Becker & Tim Black eds., 2012).
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likewise agree that knowledge is a central First Amendment value, and
yet disagree about what constitutes knowledge (as philosophers themselves do). The same is true of other schools of First Amendment
thought; many scholars agree that democracy is at the heart of the First
Amendment, for example, but have different visions of what that means
for the amendment’s coverage.211 Any type of justification-based approach falls within the ambit of a knowledge-based framework.
1. Justifications Internal to the Thinker. — One possible answer is
that while the First Amendment values justifications, it cares only that
individual thinkers do their best with the information available to them.
Reckless, irresponsible, or malicious beliefs — even if true — would not
be prioritized in the same way. That does not mean that they would be
totally unprotected, any more than falsehoods and opinion must be denied constitutional coverage in a truth-based account. The point is only
that the constitutional goal would be to encourage true beliefs that have
been reached in the proper way. The justifications that count are those
internal to the thinker.
This approach maps substantially onto what is sometimes called the
“internal” approach in epistemology.212 The basic point of that approach
is that, in Professor Laurence BonJour’s explanation:
[O]ne’s cognitive endeavors are epistemically justified only if and to the extent that they are aimed at this goal [that is, truth], which means very
roughly that one accepts all and only those beliefs which one has good
reason to think are true. To accept a belief in the absence of such a
reason . . . is to neglect the pursuit of truth; such acceptance is, one might
say, epistemically irresponsible. My contention here is that the idea of
avoiding such irresponsibility, of being epistemically responsible in one’s
believings, is the core of the notion of epistemic justification.213

On this account, the justification is something that is cognitively
available to the individual thinker. One might even go so far as to say
that intellectual responsibility is its own reward. Professors Douglas
Husak and Craig Callender point to John Locke, who wrote in An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding that a person with justification “may

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
211 Compare Bork, supra note 43, at 29 (arguing that the First Amendment covers only “criticisms
of public officials and policies, proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional
provisions and speech addressed to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country”), with
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 257 (“Literature and the arts must be protected by the First Amendment. They lead the way toward sensitive
and informed appreciation and response to the values out of which the riches of the general welfare
are created.”).
212 See generally LAURENCE BONJOUR, THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
(1985); RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 76–77 (2d ed. 1989).
213 BONJOUR, supra note 212, at 8 (cited in Husak & Callender, supra note 24, at 50 n.78).
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have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that,
though he should miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it.”214
The fact that Locke — a major influence on the Framers215 — seems
congenial with this approach suggests that traces of it might be found
within our free speech tradition. One can see the same theme in Milton’s
Areopagitica: “A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe
things only because his Pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines,
without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very
truth he holds becomes his heresy.”216
And indeed some of the foundational critiques and defenses of the
marketplace model seem rooted in the same basic notion. Meiklejohn’s
critique of Justice Holmes’s marketplace conception emphasizes this
exact point:
[The marketplace metaphor has been a] fruitful source of intellectual irresponsibility and of the errors which irresponsibility brings. We Americans,
when thinking in that vein, have taken the “competition of the market”
principle to mean that as separate thinkers, we have no obligation to test our
thinking, to make sure that it is worthy of a citizen who is one of “the rulers
of the nation.” That testing is to be done, we believe, not by us, but by “the
competition of the market.” Each one of us, therefore, feels free to think as
he pleases, to believe whatever will serve his own private interests. . . . And
to that disastrous end the beautiful words of Mr. Holmes have greatly
contributed.217

The passage bears rereading as it echoes so much contemporary angst
about information and truth. The “epistemic[] irresponsib[ility]” and
“intellectual irresponsibility” that BonJour and Meiklejohn decry boil
down to the same thing: a lack of internal justification for belief, such
as doubting President Barack Obama’s natural born citizenship as a
way of expressing disapproval of him, or believing a particularly
outlandish claim about President Donald Trump for the same reason.
Such motivated reasoning represents a paradigmatic case of epistemic
irresponsibility.218
Of course, serious challenges accompany the use of an internaljustification approach to knowledge as a constitutional lodestar. One
initial concern is that motivated reasoning is so completely pervasive
that any theory that denies its value will be unduly narrow in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
214 Husak & Callender, supra note 24, at 50 n.77 (quoting 2 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 413 (Alexander C. Fraser ed., Dover Publ’ns. 1959) (1690)).
215 Locke was the third-most-cited thinker of the Founding era, after Montesquieu and Blackstone. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 8 (2012) (citing DONALD
S. LUTZ, A PREFACE TO AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 134–40 (1992)).
216 MILTON, supra note 10, at 34.
217 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 120, at 73–74.
218 I am grateful to Professor Govind Persad for illustrating this point.
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scope.219 But, again, one can locate intellectual responsibility as the
central value of the First Amendment while accepting that it is not universal, and might even be rare. That does not mean limiting coverage
to intellectually responsible speech any more than a truth-based account
must deny coverage to falsehood.
The real challenge is not one of scope, but of method: Can the law
define the constitutional value of speech based on the mental states of
individual speakers? It can, and does. After all, the constitutionalization of defamation law has consisted in large part of an effort to identify
the mental states — negligence, actual malice, and so on — that make
a false statement actionable in various contexts.220 These are precisely
the kinds of questions one would ask within an internal-justification
model. Whatever the practical and conceptual challenges, then, it is
possible to imagine legal rules that would take into account a speaker’s
justifications for her beliefs.
In other ways — especially when accounting for the constitutional
value of false but intellectually responsible (that is, justified) statements —
the knowledge-based model might actually be more satisfying than the
marketplace model in accounting for the current rules of defamation
law. Truth (the lodestar of the marketplace model) undoubtedly matters
in the constitutional status of defamation rules. It is (today, anyway221)
regarded as a complete defense to a defamation claim.222 But the question of truth is not all there is, because not all false statements are
actionable. Depending on the context, the statement must be made with
actual malice,223 negligence, or some other actionable mental state.224
These are constitutional limitations.225 The question, then, is why the
First Amendment — and, for present purposes, the marketplace model
in particular — should care about the basis (or, perhaps, “justification”)
for a false statement.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
219 See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term — Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2011)
(“There is broad societal consensus in support of the liberal principles that animate constitutional
rights. Citizens’ perceptions of what outcomes these principles should yield in particular cases,
however, are subject to motivated cognition . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
220 See infra p. 479.
221 Schauer, supra note 88, at 700 (noting that, in the context of a criminal libel action, “the
common law recognized that there could be ‘injurious truth’” (quoting NORMAN L. ROSENBERG,
PROTECTING THE BEST MEN 119 (1986))).
222 Id. at 699–700.
223 Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (standard for cases involving
public officials).
224 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
225 Id. at 347 (“We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”).
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Of course, the JTB account — with its focus on justifications — is
not the only answer to that question. The addition of mental state requirements limits the scope of liability overall, thereby preserving more
room for discourse, which might be seen as an unambiguous good from
the perspective of free speech.226 In particular, the post-Sullivan constitutionalization has often been defended as a structural protection of the
press itself.227 One might also say that the First Amendment must protect false statements of fact because, essentially, the law cannot accurately or effectively separate falsehoods from truth and there is too much
risk that the latter would be swept in with the former, or valuable speech
chilled.228 The argument is basically one of precaution, with the protection of falsehoods regarded as a necessary evil.
There is much to be said for this argument. Epistemic humility is a
major First Amendment value229 and is consistent with a great deal of
doctrine and theory. But there is also something unsatisfying about it.
There are some categories of cases in which separating falsehood from
truth is possible. Indeed, given that falsehood is an essential element of
defamation, and truth is a complete defense, the doctrine already draws
lines between truth and falsehood. The reason for protecting falsehoods
therefore cannot rest entirely on an inability to separate them from truths.
What, then, is the positive case for protecting what we might call
justified falsehoods — those unaccompanied by actual malice, negligence, or another culpable mental state? Professor Alan Chen argues
that certain falsehoods can be valuable to autonomy and personal development.230 Others, going all the way back to Mill, have argued from
within the epistemic model that being exposed to falsehoods helps people identify and believe in truth.231 Both of these arguments have much
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
226 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719–20 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“The requirements
of a knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth as the condition for recovery in certain
defamation cases exists to allow more speech, not less.”).
227 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 286. These arguments, in turn, jibe well enough with the marketplace
model, especially if one regards the press as a constitutionally relevant actor in that marketplace.
See Joseph Blocher, Public Discourse, Expert Knowledge, and the Press, 87 WASH. L. REV. 409,
423–30 (2012).
228 Cf. Schauer, supra note 88, at 703 (“[T]he entire framework of defamation law after New York
Times is based on the strategic protection of falsity in order to maximize the dissemination of
truth . . . .”).
229 Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival
in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 281 (1991).
230 See Chen, supra note 102, at 4.
231 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (“Even a false statement may
be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about ‘the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.’” (quoting JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (1859), reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 20
(Stefan Collini ed., 1989))); MILL, supra, at 51 (concluding that silencing speech “rob[s] the human
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to recommend them, and the latter in particular is fully consistent with
the marketplace model.
The knowledge-based approach can provide a different account: a
false statement is deserving of constitutional coverage when it is based
on a sufficient justification.232 The law, in other words, can protect intellectual responsibility even when it leads to falsehood in a particular
case. This is effectively a restatement of the defamation rules. And just
as those rules are already tailored to different contexts, so too might we
want and expect intellectual responsibility to be contextually tailored
within the JTB model. Perhaps absence of malice would be the proper
threshold in some scenarios, while negligence might be the rule in others.
Consider another of Justice Holmes’s free speech aphorisms: “The
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”233 Scholars have
tended to focus on why such speech might be excluded from First
Amendment coverage — the most common explanation is that it leaves
insufficient time and space for counter-speech.234 But the fact that there
is no fire is what makes the shout actionable in the first place. And that
raises hard questions about falsehood and justification.
Imagine that Justice Holmes’s theater-goer sees what appears to be
smoke billowing into the theater. Unbeknownst to her, the smoke is all
part of the performance — a special effect intended to coincide with an
upcoming scene in which the hero saves a child from a burning building.
The theater-goer, honestly believing with justification that the theater is
on fire, falsely shouts “FIRE!,” causing a stampede in which many people are injured. Those people sue. Can she be found liable?235
A judge faced with such a case would almost certainly focus on the
theater-goer’s mental state.236 Though the shouter turned out to be incorrect (that is, untruthful), she was not intellectually irresponsible —
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
race” because even when an opinion is false, its contrast with the truth will more clearly illuminate
the latter).
232 My focus in this section is on internal justifications — that is, mental states — but one might
take the same approach with external justifications as well.
233 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
234 See Carlton F.W. Larson, “Shouting ‘Fire’ in a Theater”: The Life and Times of Constitutional
Law’s Most Enduring Analogy, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 181, 183–85 (2015).
235 Consider, too, a scenario with precisely the same facts except that there actually is a fire, but
one whose smoke is not yet visible. The theater-goer shouts “FIRE!” and causes a stampede in
which many people are injured. The statement is true, but not justified — Gettier’s argument,
combined with Justice Holmes’s metaphor.
236 The Supreme Court has long emphasized the necessity of a culpable mental state in assessing
statutes which may criminalize speech. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam) (striking down Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Act on the basis that it was not limited to
proscribing advocacy “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to
incite or produce such action” (emphasis added)); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319–20 (1957)
(focusing on the importance of intent in reiterating that the constitutionality of the Smith Act was
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not negligent, malicious, or even careless. In other words, her internal
justifications are sufficiently strong to provide a defense, notwithstanding
the fact that her speech does not advance democracy or truth or any
plausible First Amendment value besides her own autonomy.
One might object that this approach would expand the realm of protected speech too far — after all, a falsehood is not knowledge, even if
it is justified. But a knowledge-based approach need not protect only
knowledge, any more than a truth-based approach need protect only
truth. In both cases, the point is to orient law and theory toward a
particular end. And the knowledge-based approach, unlike one based
solely on truth, makes justifications relevant, which in turn makes it
easier to account for constitutional protection of the justified falsehood.
2. External Justifications for Knowledge. — Partly in response to
the kinds of challenges discussed above, and also thanks to the fundamental problem posed by Gettier,237 some theories of knowledge have
stipulated justifications that go beyond internal thought processes.
These “external” theories involve something more. An externalist
“would say that what we want from justification is the kind of objective
probability needed for knowledge, and only external conditions on justification imply this probability.”238 Often, but not always, these external approaches overlap with social epistemology, which “focuses on public and institutional practices that can foster the acquisition of
knowledge or information.”239
But in fact there seems to be considerable overlap between trends in
epistemology — at least as they relate to external justifications — and
First Amendment doctrine and scholarship. Many free speech scholars
have begun to focus on the practices and institutions that produce truth
and knowledge, instead of (or in addition to) evaluating the truth value
of particular statements.240 Applied to the issue of justification, this
suggests that the question is whether a particular true belief has been
acquired through the proper institutions and practices: professional
training, higher education, open discussion, and so on.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
dependent on it being “aimed at the advocacy and teaching of concrete action for the forcible overthrow of the Government, and not of principles divorced from action”).
237 Husak & Callender, supra note 24, at 46 (“Gettier is commonly taken to have refuted internalism, and to have demonstrated that genuine knowledge consists of true belief that is to some
extent externally justified.”).
238 Steup, supra note 23, § 2.5.
239 Goldman & Cox, supra note 147, at 2 (“Individual epistemology is concerned with purely
private events and processes, such as perceptual experience or inference; social epistemology focuses
on public and institutional practices that can foster the acquisition of knowledge or information.”);
see also GOLDMAN, supra note 64, at 4 (“An enormous portion of our truth seeking . . . is either
directly or indirectly social.”).
240 See sources cited infra note 242.
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Social epistemology is an attractive tool for the First Amendment’s
epistemological challenges. It allows one to remain generally agnostic
about the truth value of particular statements, as Justice Holmes himself
would have wanted,241 without giving up on the notion that some
statements are true and some are false. Moreover, social epistemology
has much in common with First Amendment approaches that are
themselves sociological, in the sense that they take account of — and
privilege — certain institutions, practices, and disciplines. Especially
for the past fifteen years or so, free speech scholars have argued that
free speech law can and should “recognize those informational, investigative, and communicative domains whose more-or-less distinctive
properties warrant special First Amendment treatment.”242
Many of the scholars in this vein self-identify as institutionalists, and
they advance a range of different arguments. For some, institutionalism
is simply a matter of bringing doctrine into step with lived reality, or of
providing the self-governance without which certain social practices and
organizations simply cannot survive, or of furthering the goals of a robust democracy and limiting the power of a sometimes-overweening
state.243 For others, institutionalism is about finding a way to support
the marketplace of ideas.244 Still others have pursued similar aims in
the name of pluralism.245
The search for valid justifications in a knowledge-based approach to
the First Amendment might map onto these efforts to enumerate and
justify special treatment of institutions, professions,246 social practices,247 and the like. This is not an easy task from an epistemological
or legal perspective, let alone from a perspective that combines the two.
The underlying challenge is how to identify the incentives and social
practices that have a particular relationship to knowledge.
One possibility would be to begin with the marketplace model. Just
as truth is supposed to prevail over falsehood “in a free and open encounter,”248 so too might we expect desirable justifications to prevail
over other justifications (or none at all). The decline of traditional news
media would on this view be prima facie evidence of its unreliability as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
241
242

See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
Schauer, supra note 45, at 1278. See generally PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT
INSTITUTIONS (2012); Symposium, Constitutional “Niches”: The Role of Institutional Context in
Constitutional Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463 (2007); Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression
in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 432 (2009) (“A system of free speech depends . . . on an
infrastructure of free expression . . . [which] includes the kinds of media and institutions for
knowledge, creation, and dissemination that are available at any point in time.”).
243 See generally HORWITZ, supra note 242.
244 E.g., Blocher, supra note 4, at 855.
245 E.g., JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH
DEEP DIFFERENCE (2016).
246 See Haupt, supra note 40, at 1269.
247 See Post, supra note 19, at 1278–79.
248 MILTON, supra note 10, at 45.
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a source of truth. Like the marketplace of ideas, the marketplace of
justifications approach would basically relieve judges and others from
having to make difficult and inevitably normative determinations.
But the marketplace logic seems even more problematic with regard
to justifications than it does with regard to truth alone. For one thing,
the nature of the relevant “competition” is somewhat obscure. Presumably, it would mean that if two people have the same true belief and
come into competition with one another, then the one with a better justification would “prevail” over the other. Credentialed experts, for example, might receive deference above and beyond the truth value of the
statements that they are making at any given time.
This is an empirical supposition, however, and it seems entirely plausible that a marketplace of justifications will end up favoring those that
confirm existing biases or are cheaply acquired. From the perspective
of an audience, truth acquired cheaply might be just as functionally useful — and therefore prized — as truth that rests on a proper foundation.
As a result, speakers who can provide truths at low cost have an advantage over those who have earned their true beliefs through expensive
and time-consuming processes like higher education or professional
training.
In the end, it seems unlikely that a laissez-faire approach will result
in identification of desirable (reliable, for example) external justifications. What might be preferable would be to establish a list of desirable
characteristics and an institutional actor capable of applying them
accurately and legitimately. Neither of these questions is easy, of course,
but neither are they unanswerable. As Greenawalt notes: “If truth is a
meaningful concept and people are capable of asserting many propositions of fact and value with confidence, they must have some basis for
recognizing what social practices promote the discovery of truth.”249
To identify those social practices, Greenawalt suggests a kind of comparative and historical approach — “to look at various societies and
historical periods to see when the discovery of truth has prospered.”250
One might also look at practices and contexts within contemporary societies — comparing, for example, online message boards and university
classrooms. Truths appear in each of those places, but they appear more
reliably in the latter.
In fact, a version of this approach has long been defended in philosophical circles. The basic notion of reliabilism is essentially that certain
practices reliably (even if imperfectly) lead to truth, and then can serve
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
249 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 133; see also POST, supra note 15, at 32 (citing Allen Buchanan,
Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 95, 103 (2004)) (emphasizing
importance of “the social identification of experts, that is, epistemic authorities, individuals or
groups to whom others defer as reliable sources of true beliefs”).
250 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 133.
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as valid external justifications for knowledge.251 The question of predictive strength and reliability often comes up in discussions of science,
where scientific knowledge is often evaluated based on probabilistic
theories, not on a bright line around “truth.”252 Thomas Kuhn’s theory
is consistent with this basic idea — that science does not salt away certain hard truths but is constantly subject to observation and retesting,
and the occasional revolution.253 In the First Amendment context, this
would mean that beliefs acquired through reliable practices have the
proper justification to count as knowledge.
This of course does not mean that judges and legal scholars should
outsource First Amendment cases to the arbitration of epistemologists.
But law often employs tools from other disciplines to help answer concrete questions like whether a particular arrangement of businesses is
anticompetitive,254 or whether a burden on constitutionally protected
activity is sufficiently tailored to achieve the government’s goal.255
Epistemological debates do not always lend themselves to precision or
certainty (though there are some arguments that are accepted as
proofs256), but they are no less precise or certain than constitutional law
as a whole, and they may be more important to legal reasoning than is
sometimes supposed.257
The basic questions of what makes knowledge valuable, and what
makes it distinct from truth, are common to both enterprises, despite the
additional twists and turns that constitutional analysis might mandate.
There is no need for lawyers to pretend that the questions we face are
unique and original when they are not. Philosophical enquiries can be

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
251
252

Steup, supra note 23, §§ 2.3–.5.
See Roesler, supra note 143, at 464–71 (“[P]robability theories share a common objective: they
seek to test the relative strength of theories or hypotheses so that scientists can continually refine
their theories. . . . Legal doctrine should be based on this basic understanding of the inherent nature
of scientific knowledge rather than on inapplicable notions of absolute truth versus falsity.” Id. at
471.). Professor Shannon Roesler points to Karl Popper, who “argued that the strength of a given
hypothesis depends on how well corroborated it is, which in turn depends on how well the hypothesis has survived tests designed to disprove or falsify it and its boldness.” Id. at 466.
253 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
254 John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in
Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 618–22 (2005) (noting that dependence on economics
and economic experts has increased in recent antitrust litigation while also arguing that courts
largely remain the gatekeepers for what sorts of economic authority and models are legitimate).
255 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201–04 (1976) (statistical surveys); see also Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (“In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute,
courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994))).
256 See, e.g., supra p. 463.
257 See generally Michael S. Pardo, The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof, 16 LEGAL THEORY
37, 38 (2010) (arguing that there is a deep connection between knowledge and legal proofs).
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a useful guide,258 and epistemology can help clarify and defend core
concepts, even though — and perhaps because — lawyers and legal
scholars tend to invoke the concept of knowledge more loosely than
philosophers do.259
C. When and How Knowledge Matters: A Comment
on Professional Speech and NIFLA v. Becerra
Having ranged through First Amendment theory and epistemological
debates, it is time to return to caselaw. For even if the knowledge-based
account is appealing as a matter of constitutional theory, epistemology,
or information policy, to succeed as constitutional law it must be able to
contribute to the adjudication of First Amendment disputes. And it can.
The constitutional treatment of professional speech is perhaps the
most fruitful example. Haupt defines such speech as that which “communicates a knowledge community’s insights from a professional to a
client, within a professional-client relationship, for the purpose of giving
professional advice.”260 Importantly, this is a contextual and somewhat
narrow definition, not a prescription for giving heightened protection to
any speech uttered by professionals or other “elites.” And although with
one notable exception (discussed below) the Supreme Court has yet to
provide much guidance about the doctrinal status of professional
speech,261 many cases have implicitly treated it as a distinct category.262
Some have done so by striking down laws that interfere with the transmission of professional knowledge.263
But treating professional speech differently does not always mean
giving it more protection. Some courts have effectively exempted
restrictions on professional speech from the strict scrutiny that usually
applies to content-based restrictions.264 Licensing restrictions and
malpractice liability are permissible in the context of professional
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
258 See generally Blasi, supra note 83, at 18, 25–28 (noting Justice Holmes’s engagement with
philosophers and thinkers outside the law, including Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and pragmatists such as John Dewey, William James, and Charles Sanders Peirce).
259 Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2043
(2009) (“Law and policy speak of knowledge in broader, looser, and more general terms . . . .”).
260 Claudia E. Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J.F. 185, 195 (2018); see
also Haupt, supra note 40, at 1247.
261 Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183,
183 (2018) (“[T]he Supreme Court has said little about the intersection of occupational licensing and
the First Amendment.”).
262 Haupt, supra note 40, at 1240–41 (collecting cases).
263 See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017) (striking
down recordkeeping, inquiry, and antiharassment provisions of the Florida Firearms Owners’
Privacy Act, which limited physicians’ ability to discuss firearms with patients).
264 See, e.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014); Pickup v. Brown, 740
F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 568–70 (4th Cir.
2013).
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speech265 notwithstanding the restrictions they place on the marketplace
of ideas. In effect, then, recognizing professional speech does not
necessarily mean giving it “more”266 or “less” protection; it means
recognizing the professions’ disciplinarity, which might sometimes be
quite restrictive.
For purposes of the knowledge-based approach, what matters is that
the standards and practices of the relevant knowledge communities —
whether they be scientific,267 academic,268 medical,269 journalistic,270 or
otherwise — provide the standards against which the speech that claims
their mantle must be judged. In Post’s words, “democratic competence
can be judicially protected only if courts incorporate and apply the
disciplinary methods by which expert knowledge is defined.”271 And
that means that the doctrine must confront precisely the questions with
which this Article has attempted to grapple: which justifications for
belief matter, and in which contexts?
Unsurprisingly, the boundaries of professional speech remain contested.272 It seems clear, though, that, in keeping with the JTB approach, they are defined in large part by epistemological method rather
than by accuracy alone.273 It is the disciplinarity underlying it — the
justification, in other words — that gives such speech its status, and not
simply its accuracy in any specific instance. If an expert is an expert
only on the occasions when she is right, then there is nothing to the label.
As Post puts it: “We rely on expert ‘knowledge’ precisely because it has
been vetted and reviewed by those whose judgment we have reason to
trust. All living disciplines are institutional systems for the production
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
265 See Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
939, 950–51.
266 Sherman, supra note 261, at 183–84 (arguing that “occupational speech, including even expert
advice, is entitled to far more protection than lower courts have given it, and is likely entitled to
strict scrutiny”).
267 See, e.g., KUHN, supra note 253, at 3 (emphasizing the need to study actual episodes in the
history of science — and the professional communities in which they take place — to understand
scientific rationality). See generally BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE:
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (2d ed. 1986) (examining the complex social, technological, and practical interactions that go into the creation of scientific knowledge).
268 See Post, supra note 45, at 163 (“The social practices necessary for a marketplace of ideas to
serve a truth-seeking function are perhaps most explicitly embodied in the culture of scholarship
inculcated in universities and professional academic disciplines.”).
269 See Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 296 (2010).
270 Blocher, supra note 227, at 440–42.
271 POST, supra note 15, at 54.
272 Haupt, supra note 260, at 188 (arguing for a narrow definition).
273 Haupt, supra note 40, at 1251 (“[M]embers of knowledge communities have shared notions of
validity and a common way of knowing and reasoning (consider the old adage of ‘thinking like a
lawyer’).” (footnote omitted)).
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of such ‘knowledge.’”274 The identification of these disciplines will be
contested, but that does not mean it is impossible. As Greenawalt notes,
“any idea that people are wholly incapable of evaluating what sorts of
social practices promote discovery of truth is untenable.”275
The crucial issue therefore becomes a boundary question about when
professional speech is at issue. Justifications, as a matter of law, are not
always constitutionally relevant. In many settings, other constitutional
principles — the equality of speakers and viewpoints, for example —
trump the First Amendment’s epistemological values.276 As suggested
above, resolving the boundary question requires a threshold consideration of the audience and context; professional speech doctrine does not
apply to speech by a professional in public discourse.277
One sees this distinction in Justice White’s influential concurrence in
Lowe v. SEC,278 which until recently was perhaps the most significant
pronouncement by a Justice on the question of professional speech.
Writing for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White concluded that “[o]ne who takes the affairs of a client personally
in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the
light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances is properly
viewed as engaging in the practice of a profession”; any speech exercised
in doing so is only “incidental” to that conduct.279 By contrast, a speaker
who does not “purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted”
has a stronger First Amendment claim.280 Justice White’s distinction
essentially maps the public-nonpublic distinction discussed above.
Questions about professional speech lay at the heart of the Supreme
Court’s decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v.
Becerra281 (NIFLA). The case has been celebrated and criticized from
a variety of different angles.282 My purpose here is not to provide a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
274
275
276
277
278

POST, supra note 15, at 8.
Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 133.
See POST, supra note 15, at xiii.
See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result).
472 U.S. 181; id. at 211 (White, J., concurring in the result); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (concluding that “a rough distinction always exists”
between regulation of a vocation and of speech); Sherman, supra note 261, at 186–87 (noting and
bemoaning the influence of Justice White’s opinion on lower courts).
279 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring in the result).
280 Id.
281 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
282 See, e.g., Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, NIFLA v. Becerra: A Seismic Decision Protecting Occupational Speech, 2017–2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 197, 197–98 (“[I]t is no exaggeration
to say that NIFLA cements the Roberts Court as the most libertarian in our nation’s history on
free-speech issues.”); The Supreme Court, 2017 Term — Leading Cases, 132 HARV. L. REV. 277, 351
(2018) (“The Court fundamentally undermined its previous commercial speech doctrine, which allowed compelled disclosures in order to protect consumer interests, and advanced one side in the
abortion debate by carving out a convoluted exception to its previous medical-disclosure cases.”).

2019]

FREE SPEECH AND JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF

489

further broad assessment, but only to suggest that some aspects of the
Court’s reasoning might have been improved by a tighter focus on
knowledge, instead of appeals to the traditional marketplace model.
At issue in NIFLA was a California law (the FACT Act283) that imposed disclosure requirements on what are sometimes called crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs), which might appear to be standard healthcare
providers but in fact provide antiabortion counseling.284 As the Court
summarized, the Act required that “[l]icensed clinics must notify women
that California provides free or low-cost services, including abortions,
and give them a phone number to call. Unlicensed clinics must notify
women that California has not licensed the clinics to provide medical
services.”285 The Ninth Circuit upheld the restrictions.286
In a 5-4 decision, with Justice Thomas writing for the majority, the
Supreme Court concluded that the California law was a content-based
restriction and struck it down.287 The Court declined to recognize
(though explicitly did not foreclose288) a special doctrine for professional
speech: “Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals.’”289 Denying protection to professional speech, the majority
suggested, would give the state “unfettered power to reduce a group’s
First Amendment rights by simply imposing a licensing requirement.”290
This part of the decision rests on a false dichotomy. Recognizing
professional speech as a First Amendment category need not mean giving the state “unfettered power.” It might, for example, mean giving the
state power to recognize the professions’ own disciplinary standards —
not their “truths,” but rather their methods of knowing. That might be
difficult, and contestable, but it would not leave professional speech “unprotected.” Nor would the doctrine extend to all speech “uttered by
professionals.” Even the most fervent supporters of professional speech
doctrine do not suggest that it extends to all statements by professionals.
Only in certain contexts is professional knowledge relevant — including,
perhaps, the offices of licensed clinics.291
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123470–123473 (West 2016).
NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368.
Id. See generally HEALTH & SAFETY § 123472.
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 829, 840 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d
sub nom. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
287 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371, 2378.
288 Id. at 2375 (“[N]either California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive reason for
treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment
principles. We do not foreclose the possibility that some such reason exists.”).
289 Id. at 2371–72.
290 Id. at 2375.
291 See Post, supra note 265, at 947–48 (evaluating the distinction between a dentist engaged in
public discourse and one speaking outside of public discourse and subject to sanction). How one
defines these contexts is a hard question, and the briefing in NIFLA offered many alternatives. See
McNamara & Sherman, supra note 282, at 212–13 (summarizing approaches suggested by the
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For present purposes, however, what is more relevant is the Court’s
reliance on the marketplace metaphor:
[W]hen the government polices the content of professional speech, it can fail
to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.” Professionals might have a host of good-faith disagreements, both with each other and with the government, on many topics in
their respective fields. Doctors and nurses might disagree about the ethics
of assisted suicide or the benefits of medical marijuana; lawyers and marriage counselors might disagree about the prudence of prenuptial agreements or the wisdom of divorce; bankers and accountants might disagree
about the amount of money that should be devoted to savings or the benefits
of tax reform. “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market,” and the people lose when
the government is the one deciding which ideas should prevail.292

It is hard to imagine a more confident statement of the traditional
epistemic model — indeed, the notion that the truth “will ultimately
prevail” is even more certain than Justice Holmes’s “best test of truth.”
NIFLA therefore sets up an unusually crisp contrast between the marketplace model and the JTB alternative described here. In significant
ways, JTB proves more attractive.
NIFLA’s marketplace model runs into problems from the start,
many of which are the fundamental critiques that have plagued the
model for so long.293 For example, the regulated context — licensed
professionals speaking to potential patients about medical services —
involves precisely the kind of power imbalance that makes many skeptical of the marketplace model. And given the particular subject matter
of abortion services, the notion that “truth will out” in the long run is
especially unattractive, since a woman seeking an abortion has a limited
(and in many places shrinking) time frame in which to obtain it.294 As
always, the fallback defense for the marketplace model might be that it
is still better than government regulation. But that is not particularly
convincing here, since the regulation itself — which applied only to conversations with patients — would not even reach the debates among
professionals that the majority invoked. That particular marketplace of
ideas could continue to function as before.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
United States, Public Citizen, the Cato Institute, and the Institute for Justice); cf. Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (noting that First Amendment coverage is triggered “in certain
circumstances” when a government employee “speak[s] as a citizen addressing matters of public
concern”).
292 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2374–75 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014); and then quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
293 See supra section I.B, pp. 451–59.
294 See An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://
www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws [https://perma.cc/M3UP-PUG7].
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Even beyond the practical impact on speakers, the kind of law challenged in NIFLA involves a claim — compelled speech — whose harm
is easier to conceptualize in terms of JTB than in terms of “truth” alone.
The marketplace of ideas is usually thought to benefit from the addition
of new voices and ideas.295 Of course, distortion and other concerns
might be present, but, as the Court has previously noted, “disclosure
requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests
than do flat prohibitions on speech.”296 If the remedy for false speech is
more speech, why shouldn’t the same be true of compelled speech? A
crisis pregnancy center might simply say: “We are required by law to tell
you that the state of California provides low-cost abortion services. But
we believe that taking advantage of them is tantamount to committing
murder, and we want to help you avoid that.” This would, after all,
come close to what the Court suggested that California could do: engage
in its own “public-information campaign” to educate women about crisis
pregnancy centers.297
From the perspective of JTB, however, compelled speech presents
an additional kind of epistemic harm: it interferes with the disciplinarity
and social practices that contribute to true belief. Under, for example,
a reliabilist approach to justification,298 a particular practice’s ability to
reliably produce true beliefs would be harmed if it were coerced into
endorsing other beliefs. If the medical profession reliably induces true
beliefs in patients (that vaccines prevent certain diseases, for example),
it may be particularly important that the messages coming from that
profession be unedited by others. Conversely, as Justice Breyer has put
it, when “speech is subject to independent regulation by canons of the
profession[,] . . . [which] obligat[e speech,] . . . the government’s own interest in forbidding that speech is diminished.”299 The creation of
knowledge, in other words, depends on a kind of nongovernmental regulation, which in turn shields that knowledge from unnecessary governmental regulation.
As to the intramural professional debates, as an epistemological matter the invocation of the marketplace in NIFLA was especially unconvincing on the facts of the case. The marketplace is uniquely ill-suited
to resolve “good-faith disagreements”300 about the “wisdom of divorce”
or the “ethics of assisted suicide.”301 Few people believe that there is
epistemic “truth” on such matters. They are fundamentally normative
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
295 Cf. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2388 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[The] marketplace is fostered, not
hindered, by providing information to patients to enable them to make fully informed medical decisions in respect to their pregnancies.”).
296 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
297 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2376.
298 See sources cited supra note 130 and accompanying text.
299 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 446 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
300 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2374–75.
301 Id. at 2375.
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debates over which even a capacious reading of the marketplace model
would likely have only limited sway.
Can and should such debates be informed by facts? Of course. And
the JTB approach — and a doctrine of professional speech — can better
account for how, as a matter of practice, law should and does treat some
speakers differently in some contexts. Lawyers might disagree with one
another about the wisdom of prenuptial agreements, but only they can
give legal advice about them. Why does law recognize such a limit on
speech? Because lawyers and doctors are recognized as having special
expertise, which in particular contexts — a professional relationship, per
Justice White — demands different treatment. That does not require
that the profession reach unanimity on any of the contested issues listed
in NIFLA, nor on others that have a more recognizable truth value. The
fact that lawyers and doctors might respond differently to different scenarios does not mean that their disagreements are anything other than
professional. They might disagree, and they might sometimes be wrong,
but their professional training gives them the proper justifications for
their beliefs. When they fall short of those professional standards, they
lose the benefit of that justification and may be subject to special forms
of liability, like malpractice, that would be unconstitutional if applied in
other contexts.
The traditional marketplace model has a hard time accounting for
these features of existing law. Longstanding doctrine recognizes that the
special status of the professions may allow legitimate restrictions that
elsewhere would be unconstitutional. For example, the Court has upheld
“laws that require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial
information in their ‘commercial speech.’”302 These laws are typically
justified on epistemic grounds.303 Most prominently, in Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,304 the
Court upheld a fee disclosure requirement, explaining that “[b]ecause
the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides,” the “constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in . . . advertising is minimal.”305
California argued that the FACT Act fell within this exception, since
the disclosures were purely factual, and designed to counter what might
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
302 Id. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
303 See, e.g., Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935) (upholding state
dentistry regulation that “afford[ed] protection against ignorance, incapacity and imposition”); Dent
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (upholding medical licensing requirements that “tend to
secure [a State’s citizens] against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity[,] as well as of deception and fraud”).
304 471 U.S. 626.
305 Id. at 651.
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otherwise be confusion.306 But Justice Thomas’s majority opinion
rejected this antideception purpose,307 and found that Zauderer was
inapplicable — not because the specific information was anything but
factual, but because, in part, state-sponsorship of abortion itself is
controversial.308 As Justice Breyer noted in dissent, however, “[a]bortion
is a controversial topic and a source of normative debate, but the
availability of state resources is not a normative statement or a fact of
debatable truth.”309
The hard question after NIFLA will be where facts end and
“controversy” begins. This is a hard question to answer from within the
marketplace framework, as it offers no obvious markers for when a
“truth” has been “accepted,” to adopt Justice Holmes’s language in
Abrams.310 There must be some limits, or else the exception would swallow the exception — the Court might as well have overruled Zauderer
outright. The question is who should get to draw those limits. One
possibility, of course, would be the people acting through their elected
representatives. But that would mean letting the government decide
“which ideas should prevail”: precisely what the marketplace of ideas
forbids. NIFLA essentially tacks hard in the other direction, leaving it
to judges to determine which matters are “controversial” and whether —
as seems to be the case in NIFLA — that conclusion extends to all
factual predicates of a normative debate.
The knowledge-based approach, by contrast, would suggest that the
limitations could be drawn by the relevant knowledge community itself.
If scientists agree on the value of vaccines, then the matter is not “controversial.” If doctors do not agree on “the ethics of assisted suicide,”
then it is controversial — either because there is “good-faith disagreement” about truth, or (more likely) because it is a normative issue with
no truth value. It will of course be hard to decide which knowledge
community should speak to which issue, and what level of agreement is
necessary, and so on. But current doctrine is essentially making these
determinations already, in a far less transparent way. NIFLA’s declaration
that certain matters are “controversial” is an example of this phenomenon
of opaque assessment.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
306 The legislature had in fact found that some crisis pregnancy centers “employ ‘intentionally
deceptive advertising and counseling practices [that] often confuse, misinform, and even intimidate
women from making fully-informed, time-sensitive decisions about critical health care.’” Nat’l Inst.
of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. ASSEMB. COMM. ON HEALTH, AB 775, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (2015), rev’d sub
nom. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
307 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2377.
308 Id. at 2372 (describing the law as requiring “these clinics to disclose information about statesponsored services — including abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic”).
309 Id. at 2388 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
310 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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To be clear, my goal here is not to offer a full-throated defense of
professional speech doctrine. There may be very good reasons to reject
it, as evidenced by the Court’s reluctance to adopt a single doctrinal
pronouncement,311 or the ability of existing First Amendment tools to
justify it.312 NIFLA itself, for example, recognizes the possibility of restrictions on commercial advertising and professional conduct that
nonetheless involves speech.313 My more limited argument is that the
marketplace model is not a convincing reason to reject professional
speech doctrine, and that the JTB approach gives more support for recognizing it.
In short, if the goal of free speech is epistemic, then it makes sense
to recognize the special role of the practices and institutions that justify
our true beliefs. Doing so of course can raise serious concerns, however,
perhaps the most obvious of which is the apparent elitism of this approach. Would it not mean giving special treatment to precisely the
kinds of speakers (professionals, for example) who are already advantaged in the marketplace of ideas?
Not necessarily. First, my goal here is only to suggest that justifications matter, not to pick which ones matter. I happen to think that
distinct treatment of professional speech makes sense, but the JTB approach can certainly accommodate disagreement on that. Others might
argue that independent conclusions are more important than those
reached through disciplinarity. That is a separate debate from whether
justifications matter.
Moreover, to say that knowledge — or particular speakers — should
receive special treatment is not to say that privileged treatment is appropriate. After all, a doctrine of professional speech would in many
instances permit content-based restrictions that standard First Amendment
doctrines would forbid. The key is that such restrictions — like the JTB
approach as a whole — are keyed not just to particular speakers (which
would amplify the elitism concern) but to particular contexts. Thus,
while it may be impermissible for a state to fine citizens who claim the
earth is flat, it is perfectly permissible for a state university to deny
tenure to a geography professor who teaches as much, contrary to the
standards of her discipline. If that same professor were, on her own
time and as a private citizen, to propound such theories in public
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
See Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 67,
74 (2016). I am less sanguine about the Court’s suggestion that content-based restrictions can only
be based on “persuasive evidence . . . of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition to that effect.”
NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Alvarez,
567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012) (plurality opinion)). That rule itself appears to be a recent doctrinal innovation. See Lakier, supra note 200, passim.
313 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. It hardly needs to be said that adding more strain to the
speech-conduct distinction carries complications of its own.
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discourse, she would again be immune from sanction. The full context,
and not just the speaker’s identity, is what matters.
More generally, this particular complication emphasizes the ways in
which the JTB approach can and must operate hand in hand with
broader social practices — those that identify the appropriate disciplines, institutions, or other justifications for true beliefs. On that note,
the “post-truth” challenge is not only about increased skepticism about
“facts,” but about a lack of trust in institutions more generally.314 The
theory relies on that trust, but cannot provide it. Identifying a core of
disciplinary knowledge deserving of special First Amendment treatment
is a difficult task, made even harder when professional and licensing
organizations understand themselves as being engaged with broader issues of justice, fairness, and the like.315 That is not to say that
knowledge-based fields must stay in narrow lanes, only that the conflation of disciplinary knowledge and political positions makes it harder to
provide an epistemic defense of the former. Of course, for those who
believe that knowledge is politics (or vice versa), that will not be satisfying. The theory described here — or, for that matter, any epistemic
account of the First Amendment — has little to offer them.
This leads to the second caveat, which is that the JTB approach —
like the theory it is meant to amend, though perhaps even more so —
would have a limited reach. Not all free speech controversies are amenable to a theory rooted in epistemic values. Restrictions on nonrepresentational art or instrumental music, for example, are hard to evaluate
from a “marketplace” perspective. And while the JTB alternative might
be an improvement (focusing as it does on practices, rather than truth
value alone316), it is still an awkward fit for some contexts. In public
political discourse, for example, it might be more important to adopt a
pathological frame and prevent any line-drawing among speakers and
speech (even false speech, as in the Alvarez case discussed above), while
other contexts would permit and even demand exactly that.
There is nothing novel about this caveat. Already, the Supreme
Court treats truth and falsity differently depending on the context in
which a statement is uttered — a statement that is actionable in the
professional context might not be if uttered in public discourse.317 Of
course, it is not easy to draw, let alone justify and maintain, the lines
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
314 See Jim Norman, Americans’ Confidence in Institutions Stays Low, GALLUP (June 13, 2016),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/192581/americans-confidence-institutions-stays-low.aspx [https://perma.cc/
TKQ7-7VGA] (noting low — and falling — trust in public schools, television news, and newspapers).
315 Thanks to Professor Paul Horwitz for powerfully pushing this point.
316 For a more extended argument that a practice-based approach is the best way to account for
the constitutional status of nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsensical speech, see
TUSHNET ET AL., supra note 40, at 7–9.
317 POST, supra note 15, at 44.
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between public and nonpublic discourse.318 Professor Paul Horwitz
rightly notes that the Court “has not told us clearly . . . why citizens can
generally be relied on to distinguish between true and false statements
made in the political realm and not in other areas, such as commercial
speech or securities fraud.”319 And yet the Court regularly does carve
up the constitutional space in precisely that way — and, most importantly for present purposes, it seems to do so especially often in cases
where the justifications for facts are relevant.
CONCLUSION
In legal reasoning, it is not enough that a statement be true. From
the very first day of law school, students learn that accurately stating
the result of a case is insufficient. The reasoning matters just as much,
if not more. Likewise, an expert witness cannot be recognized, nor a
professional licensed, solely on the basis of his her or true statements —
what matters is whether he or she has been right for the right reasons.
In First Amendment law and theory, the value of truth — and of the
marketplace of ideas in achieving it — has been accepted as central to
epistemic accounts of the value of free speech. That reliance has made
the epistemic account vulnerable to a wide range of powerful critiques.
Reframing the First Amendment around justified true belief, rather than
truth alone, might help resolve the amendment’s epistemological crisis
and establish an epistemic value for free speech at a time when such an
account is desperately needed.
A knowledge-based approach will not rescue us from a post-truth
era.320 But it can contribute to a richer and more productive discussion
of what free speech is for.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
318 I believe that the line exists, though I have some concerns about how to treat the transmission
of knowledge across those domains. See Blocher, supra note 227, at 416–18.
319 Horwitz, supra note 21, at 457 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982)). Soon after Horwitz’s
article, the Court decided United States v. Alvarez, striking down portions of the Stolen Valor Act
and providing further confirmation of Horwitz’s point. 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion).
320 See Schauer, supra note 8, at 919 (“Far more than First Amendment freedoms have created a
society in which truth seems to matter so little, and far more than First Amendment freedoms will
be necessary to do anything about it.”).

